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Crisis Frame Dynamics: Frame Diversity 
in News Media and the Role of 
Governmental Actors
Fynn Gerkena and Toni G. L. A. van der Meerb
aDepartment of Accounting and Finance, University of Antwerp, Antwerp, 
Belgium; bAmsterdam School of Communication Research (ASCoR), University 
of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, the Netherlands
ABSTRACT
This study aims to understand the dynamic evolvement of frames in news media coverage of 
the Ebola crisis (2014–2015) and their interplay with narratives put forth in press releases from 
governmental organizations (GOs). An automated content analysis was applied to U.S. newspapers 
and GOs’ press releases on the Ebola epidemic. Time series analyses illustrate how the scope of 
frames in news media becomes narrower (decreased diversity) with the presence of immediate 
and problem-focused crisis frames and wider (increased diversity) with more progressive frames. 
Additionally, the results imply that a level of shared interpretation (frame alignment) between 
media and GOs fosters the openness of news media for a variety of frames, which in turn might 
lead to a communicative shift that eases the crisis atmosphere.
KEYWORDS: Crisis communication; framing; news frame diversity; frame alignment; 
automated content analysis
On March 23, 2014, the World Health Organization (WHO, 2015) re-
ported on the fi rst cases of Ebola in West Africa. The emergence and 
spread of such infectious diseases are characterized by a complex of 
social, technological, and environmental dynamics that give rise to 
multiple narratives (Leach, Scoones, & Stirling, 2010). Involved actors 
(e.g., news media and governmental organizations [GOs]) socially 
co-construct and develop the meaning of these events in their commu-
nication (e.g., Schultz & Raupp, 2010). Their framing of public health 
crises suggests and promotes certain strategies and interventions that 
ultimately infl uence outbreak responses (Leach et al., 2010). This study 
CONTACT Fynn Gerken • E-mail: fynn.gerken@uantwerpen.be • Department of Accounting and Finance, 
University of Antwerp, Prinsstraat 13, 2000, Antwerp, Belgium
150 gerkin and van der meer
aims to understand the dynamic evolvement of frames in news media 
coverage of the Ebola crisis (2014–2015) and their communicative in-
terplay with narratives put forth in GOs’ press releases.
During crises, news media serve as the primary channel for crisis 
communication (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2014; 
Glik, 2007) and make crucial information available (Sorribes & Rovira, 
2011). In their role as a central realm for negotiating crisis understand-
ing, news media are considered to play a leading role in the construc-
tion and evolvement of a crisis (Kleinnijenhuis, Schultz, & Oegema, 
2015; Van der Meer, 2016b). They selectively emphasize a specific series 
of unfolding events and offer interpretations to the public of how to 
make sense of the situation at play (Van Gorp, 2007). At the same 
time, GOs, as public service organizations, have the social function 
to notify other actors about crisis developments and are an important 
source of information (Liu & Horsley, 2007). During such uncertain 
times, these organizations also need to come to an understanding of the 
quickly unfolding events, which they then react to and communicate 
about, thereby contributing to the construction of the crisis (Schultz 
& Raupp, 2010).
Framing theory offers a powerful body of literature to study over-
time patterns of narratives during crisis episodes (Geiß, Weber, & Quir-
ing, 2016; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015; Snow, Vliegenthart, & Corrigall-
Brown, 2007) and is a useful theoretical lens to understand health crises 
such as viral epidemics (e.g., Dudo, Dahlstrom, & Brossard, 2007; Lee 
& Basnyat, 2013; Luther & Zhou, 2005). Prior research has suggested 
that the concept of news frame diversity can provide important insights 
into the dynamic crisis coverage by news media (e.g., Geiß et al., 2016), 
and the concept of frame alignment allows the study of the interplay of 
news media frames with frames promoted by GOs (e.g., Van der Meer, 
Verhoeven, Beentjes, & Vliegenthart, 2014). Hence analyzing the over-
time development of news frame diversity and frame alignment promises 
novel insights into the complex crisis frame dynamics in news media 
and the communicative role of GOs. First, through the concept of news 
frame diversity, the variety of ways in which an event is framed in news 
media can be studied (Geiß et al., 2016; Huang, 2010). Previous studies 
have demonstrated that news media have a limited carrying capacity 
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(Zhu, 1992; Zhu & McCombs, 1995) and that specific interpretations 
of important events are able to temporarily displace other alternative 
views around the issue (Geiß et al., 2016). During epidemic outbreaks, 
these dominant interpretations can obscure alternative narratives that 
put forth, for example, different causes or solutions to the crisis (Leach 
et al., 2010). Therewith, a drop in diversity (i.e., the predominance of a 
few major problems or a single issue or interpretation) might have real 
consequences for the range of crisis responses that are implemented. 
Investigating what types of interpretations can cause the news media 
to narrow (or widen) their scope of frames can help understand what 
drives the uniformity (or plurality) of presented viewpoints in news 
media coverage during crises.
Second, the concept of frame alignment is useful to explore the com-
municative interplay between actors, such as news media and GOs, 
by means of frame comparison (Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 
1986). The alignment of frames can be considered to indicate an in-
crease in mutual understanding of a crisis that helps to ease the crisis 
atmosphere (e.g., Van der Meer et al., 2014). Hence, in crisis situations, 
it might be especially important how actors collectively define, under-
stand, and frame the crisis (Schultz & Raupp, 2010; Weick, 1988). To 
date, however, research has not investigated how the framing of public 
health crises in the news media relates to news media’s communicative 
interaction with GOs. It remains unclear whether a degree of openness 
for alternative views on a particular issue in news media (news frame 
diversity) results in shared interpretations across actors (frame align-
ment) or if a level of shared interpretations motivates news media to 
open up for varying views. Thus more advanced over-time analyses 
are needed to understand the causal link between news frame diversity 
and frame alignment.
To shed light on the dynamic evolvement of frames in news media 
coverage of crises and their interplay with narratives put forth in press 
releases from GOs, the following research question is addressed: How 
does the frame diversity in news media coverage in times of crisis relate 
to the presence of individual news frames and alignment with frames 
offered by GOs? To answer the question, this study relies on automated 
content analysis of a long-standing crisis (the Ebola crisis), studying 
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the framing dynamics between U.S. news media and GOs throughout 
54 weeks of the crisis.
Theoretical Framework
Framing
Framing theory offers a useful theoretical lens to investigate the dy-
namic process of meaning construction and negotiation (Gamson & 
Modigliani, 1989). In current research, Entman’s (1993) definition of 
framing has established itself as a common reference:
To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them 
more salient in the communicating text, in such a way as to promote 
a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evalua-
tion and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. (p. 52)
The idea of selection and salience implies that framing can increase at-
tention to specific aspects of an issue and minimize attention to others 
(Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). By bringing certain aspects to attention 
(De Vreese, 2005), frames help individuals to organize a series of events, 
ascribe meaning to them, and guide action (Benford & Snow, 2000).
A substantial number of studies have utilized framing to study 
health-related issues, such as obesity (e.g., Hawkins & Linvill, 2010), 
breast cancer (e.g., Andsager & Powers, 1999), and tobacco control 
(e.g., Niederdeppe, Farrelly, Thomas, Wenter, & Weitzenkamp, 2007). 
Yet, framing in severe health crises is much more dynamic given the 
dramatic nature of the events (Lee & Basnyat, 2013). Therefore a subset 
of research has focused more directly on frames in news coverage of 
infectious diseases (e.g., Dudo et al., 2007; Luther & Zhou, 2005; Shih, 
Wijaya, & Brossard, 2008; Tian & Stewart, 2005) and compared these 
to frames in GOs’ press releases (e.g., Lee & Basnyat, 2013; Rossmann, 
Meyer, & Schulz, 2018). Combined, the predominance of framing theory 
in studies of news media coverage and effects in the health literature 
demonstrates the value of this theoretical lens for examining news 
media coverage during the Ebola crisis. However, the majority of these 
studies have applied a deductive approach to classify frames (i.e., relied 
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on predefined frames) with few exceptions (e.g., Tian & Stewart, 2005). 
In contrast to this body of research, the present study identifies frames 
inductively, which results in more issue-specific frames that are directly 
related to the Ebola crisis.
News media’s crisis framing. In general, news media are an impor-
tant source for health information (Andsager & Powers, 1999; Viswanath 
& Emmons, 2006), and even more so during crisis and risk situations 
(Thomas, Friedman, Brandt, Spencer, & Tanner, 2016). News media can 
shape public opinion by calling attention to certain issues (McCombs 
& Shaw, 1972), offering interpretations of events (Van Gorp, 2007), 
and advising protective action (Liu, Fraustino, & Jin, 2015). Often, the 
public’s meaning construction and actions are based on information 
provided by news media (Sorribes & Rovira, 2011). News media make 
sense of incidences and organize them into a meaningful succession, 
thereby influencing the construction of reality (Hallahan, 1999).
The influence of media frames on the public might be particularly 
pronounced during epidemics because the public has no direct expe-
rience with the pressing topic (Ball-Rokeach & de Fleur, 1976; Shih et 
al., 2008). Depending on the salience of an epidemic on the media’s 
agenda, coverage can heighten or reduce the public’s risk perception 
(Dudo et al., 2007; Kilgo, Yoo, & Johnson, 2018). Applying Iyengar’s 
(1991) classification of generic frames into episodic (i.e., single, specific 
event-driven cases) and thematic frames (i.e., placing events into an 
overriding issue), Dudo et al. (2007) found that U.S. news coverage of 
the avian flu was dominantly episodic. Because episodic frames present 
specific event-focused cases and focus on emotions and sensationalism 
(De Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001), this kind of frame might hinder 
informed judgment about risks associated with the crisis (Dudo et al., 
2007). Thus news media, in their coverage and framing, can spark or 
prevent crisis escalation and ultimately impact the crisis evolvement 
(Schultz, Kleinnijenhuis, Oegema, Utz, & van Atteveldt, 2012).
GOs’ crisis framing. GOs are another key actor in times of crisis. As 
public organizations, they are a key holder of information and have the 
social function to communicate quickly as an objective and trustworthy 
source to protect the public (Liu & Horsley, 2007). Press releases serve 
as a vehicle for health organizations to inform the public through the 
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media (Rossmann et al., 2018). Their communication aims to notify the 
public about the actions the public should take, for example, to avoid 
physical harm (Coombs, 2007). Furthermore, to reduce psychological 
stress among the public, GOs are expected to disclose actions that are 
implemented to solve the problem and prevent similar occurrences in 
the future (e.g., Kim & Liu, 2012).
Crisis framing across actors. Frames assist actors to communicate 
via various platforms and come to a (shared) understanding of a crisis 
(Schultz & Raupp, 2010; Weick, 1988) and ultimately decrease uncer-
tainty (Leydesdorff & Ivanova, 2014). These frames can differ between 
actors per crisis phase (Van der Meer et al., 2014) because crisis actors 
provide competing interpretations (Seeger, 2002). While news media 
frequently use frames offered by sources such as GOs, they might also 
adapt these frames (Lee & Basnyat, 2013; Vasterman & Ruigrok, 2013). 
Hence frames are the result of communicative negotiation processes 
over meaning between the media and their sources (Vliegenthart & van 
Zoonen, 2011). Studying frames of news media and GOs thus promises 
useful insight into how central actors made sense of the Ebola crisis and 
how meaning construction evolved as the epidemic unfolded.
Yet, research into framing across news media and GOs has been 
limited, with few exceptions (e.g., Lee & Basnyat, 2013; Rossmann et al., 
2018; Vasterman & Ruigrok, 2013). Rossmann et al. (2018) found that 
European news coverage during the H1N1 epidemic more frequently 
emphasized risks, while press releases by GOs framed the crisis more 
dominantly in risk-attenuating terms. In contrast, Vasterman and 
Ruigrok (2013) found that while Dutch news media coverage during 
the H1N1 crisis frequently featured alarming frames, the coverage was 
not more alarming than its news sources. In addition, Lee and Basnyat 
(2013) traced press release of GOs in Singapore to news stories of the 
H1N1 crisis, showing that journalists very selectively use provided 
information and change the frames they use in coverage.
To reach a closer understanding of how news media covered the 
Ebola crisis and how GOs communicated about the epidemic, it is im-
portant to analyze the frames that both actors constructed. Therefore 
the first research question asks the following:
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RQ1: What frames are constructed by news media and GOs during 
the Ebola crisis?
News Frame Diversity
Research into communicative diversity in terms of actors, issues, and 
frames in communication has its origins in agenda-setting research 
(e.g., Jennings, Bevan, & John, 2011; Zhu, 1992). The concept of news 
frame diversity focuses on the heterogeneity of news media framing 
and can be conceptualized as the semantic variety of frames present 
in a text (Huang, 2010). Variety of frame presence in news media cov-
erage can be considered along a continuum from the dominance of a 
single frame (i.e., low news frame diversity) to complete heterogeneity 
of frames (i.e., high news frame diversity; Entman, 2003). Because the 
framing environment is contested with differently strong frames com-
peting in news coverage for dominance (Chong & Druckman, 2007), 
news frame diversity closely relates to the idea of a zero-sum dynamic 
in news media, where a rise in salience of one aspect or interpretation 
of a subject comes at the cost of the salience of another (Zhu, 1992; Zhu 
& McCombs, 1995).
Previous research has indicated that news frame diversity can pro -
vide important insights into the dynamic crisis coverage by news media 
(e.g., Geiß et al., 2016) and that the limited presence of alternative in-
formation can have consequences for crisis development (e.g., Klein-
nijenhuis et al., 2015; Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977) and solutions (Leach 
et al., 2010). When major events take place, minor items are pushed 
from the news media agenda by breaking news (Berkowitz, 1992). For 
instance, news broadcasts may devote the majority of their time to a 
segment about the Ebola outbreak. The audience can infer from this 
predominance of a single issue that a new crisis occurred (Kleinnijen-
huis et al., 2015). In a similar vein, dramatic events during crises, such 
as the diagnosis of Ebola on U.S. soil, can lead to a temporary rise of 
only a few frames focusing on key elements of the issue (Scheufele, 
2006). The resulting drop in diversity (i.e., the predominance of a single 
issue or interpretation) thus suggests a focus on a few major problems 
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(rather than a variety of minor issues), which signals an increase in 
crisis intensity (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015).
More fundamentally, the narrow focus on problems can have real 
consequences for crisis outcomes. Often, policy decisions and interven-
tions during epidemics are based on a narrow subset of potential courses 
of actions because actors and institutions “close down” around a limited 
number of narratives (Stirling, 2008). However, as long as a narrow 
focus on a few interpretations persists, “a trade-off with the issues of 
other stakeholders is more unlikely” (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015, p. 4) 
and thus alternative solutions remain absent. Particularly, health crises 
such as Ebola may require a greater openness to alternative narratives 
that “highlight issues, understandings and forms of knowledge which 
are vital to ensure that outbreak responses are attuned to local ecologi-
cal and social circumstances, and so actually work” (Leach et al., 2010, 
p. 375). Therefore, to respond appropriately to epidemics, it might be 
detrimental for news media to fail to move beyond a singular narrative 
and embrace alternative viewpoints (Leach et al., 2010; Stirling, 2008).
Despite this evidence, little research has investigated what com-
munication patterns result in a drop or rise in news frame diversity. 
Research by Geiß et al. (2016) provided evidence about the successful-
ness of frames that were promoted by influential actors to temporarily 
displace alternative frames around important events. Focusing on the 
health context, the present study investigates what interpretations cause 
news media to narrow or widen their scope of frames during crises. 
The second research question, therefore, asks the following:
RQ2: What type of crisis frames are associated with a rise or drop in 
frame diversity in news media coverage?
Frame Alignment
Besides the variety of frames in news media, the similarity of frames 
between actors can offer further understanding of the communica-
tive crisis process. During crises, actors desire to resolve differences 
and come to a collective understanding of ambiguous and confusing 
events (Snow et al., 1986; Van der Meer et al., 2014). After individual 
meaning production, actors engage in collective sense making, which 
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is likely to result in a temporal construction of similar frames (Van der 
Meer et al., 2014). This similarity in frame construction can be under-
stood as frame alignment. Therefore, in this article, frame alignment 
is conceptualized as the similarity in presence of comparable frames 
in actors’ communication about a certain event. Previous studies have 
already provided qualitative (Snow et al., 1986) and quantitative (Van 
der Meer et al., 2014) evidence for different degrees of frame alignment 
throughout crises.
The level of alignment can also have substantial consequences for 
crisis development. As long as confusion and incoherence are the 
prevailing states of crisis, a solution to the crisis is improbable (Weick, 
1988). Before a crisis can be solved, actors need to reach a degree of 
consensus about what happened and what the complex events mean 
(Van der Meer et al., 2014). As interpretations of events become more 
similar, resulting in frame alignment, actors can reach a shared under-
standing (Snow et al., 1986) to avoid further escalation (Weick, 1988), 
creating a precondition for crisis resolution.
Frame Alignment and News Frame Diversity
Prior literature indicates that both shared interpretations between 
actors (frame alignment; Snow et al., 1986; Van der Meer et al., 2014; 
Weick, 1988) and a diverse set of presented viewpoints in news media 
(high news frame diversity; e.g., Huang, 2010; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 
2015; Wong, Ormiston, & Tetlock, 2011) are important preconditions 
for relaxing the crisis atmosphere. However, it remains unclear whether 
a plurality of perspectives in news media (high news frame diversity) 
results in shared interpretations across actors (frame alignment) or if 
a level of shared interpretations motivates news media to open up for 
varying views.
On one hand, it is plausible that the media debate first needs to 
open up to a broader set of perspectives (frame diversity) before they 
can reach a level of shared interpretation of events with GOs (frame 
alignment). As the crisis develops, news media coverage might move 
away from the few dramatic interpretations of the events and turn 
toward a greater variety of explanations. With the increasing diver-
sity, an increase in perspectives is stimulated and openness for new 
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information motivated (Wong et al., 2011). The necessary “space” in 
the news media debate might be created for GOs’ frames to become 
salient. The openness, in turn, might motivate actors to interact (Klein-
nijenhuis et al., 2015), which might stimulate a shared understanding of 
what the events signify and result in a rapprochement of actors’ frames 
(Van der Meer et al., 2014).
On the other hand, shared interpretation among GOs and news 
media (frame alignment) might be a precondition for media to move 
away from homogeneous framing and a crisis atmosphere to open up 
for multiple interpretations and viewpoints (frame diversity). Frame 
alignment with GOs might have a calming impact on the news media 
coverage and scope of frames, thereby increasing frame diversity. In 
the midst of a crisis, media are often focused on the dramatic nature 
of the events (Reintjes et al., 2016) and thus might initially neglect the 
information and interpretations offered by the GOs. However, once 
news media open up to these interpretations and reach a level of mutual 
understanding, there may be a calming impact on news media cover-
age, allowing a shift of attention to alternative interpretations. Thus, 
with the widening of opinions away from the narrow set of problems, 
possible solutions can be discussed and the crisis atmosphere eases 
(Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015). To disentangle this complex communica-
tive process, the third research question is formulated as follows:
RQ3: How does frame diversity in news media in times of crisis relate 
to the alignment with frames offered by the GOs?
Method
Data Collection
To answer the research questions, an automated content analysis of 
U.S. newspaper coverage and GOs’ press releases was conducted. The 
Ebola crisis was selected as a case because the epidemic provides a 
unique opportunity to study the dynamic crisis coverage of news media 
and examine how news reporting affects (or is affected by) interaction 
with GOs. The crisis began in March 2014 when the first cases were 
reported in Guinea (WHO, 2015). While the majority of cases were 
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reported in West Africa, attention in the United States was especially 
high when four people were diagnosed with the virus in the United 
States in September and October 2014. Given the significance and the 
scale of the outbreak, the crisis offers an interesting context to answer 
this study’s research questions.
Newspaper articles and press releases were collected between June 29, 
2014, when attention started to increase in U.S. news media, and July 5, 
2015, when attention faded away, indicated by a decreasing number 
of articles about the epidemic. Five U.S. newspapers with complete 
articles on LexisNexis were selected (the New York Times, Washington 
Post, USA Today, Daily News [New York], and New York Post). Relevant 
articles were selected by applying a search string containing the words 
“Ebola,” “EVD” (for Ebola virus disease), or “EHD” (for Ebola hem-
orrhagic disease). This resulted in a total sample of 1,079 newspaper 
articles. In total, four GOs were selected (the United Nations, WHO, 
World Bank, and Centers for Disease Control and Prevention). Their 
websites were searched for press releases about the outbreak, resulting 
in a total sample of 324 press releases.
Operationalization
Frames. This study applies an inductive method to automatically 
identify frames in actors’ crisis communication. More specifically, a 
semantic network analysis was conducted, identifying latent patterns 
in text based on word (co-)occurrences (Hellsten, Dawson, & Leydes-
dorff, 2010). This automated approach draws on the idea that a text 
can be seen as a network of words that conveys their meaning, with 
each network serving as an indicator for the frame they represent. By 
clustering groups of correlating words, a higher order structure in text 
and between text can be identified and frames detected (Hellsten et al., 
2010). In other words, analyzing the (co-)occurrence of words allows 
one to quantify meaning in measurable units of analysis, thereby avoid-
ing subjective bias. Research has already successfully applied this meth-
od, for instance, to compare discourses (Leydesdorff, 2005) or to explore 
crisis frames (Gerken, Van der Land, & Van der Meer, 2016; Van der 
Meer, 2014; Van der Meer et al., 2014). Thus frames in this research 
will be operationalized as (co-)occurrences in communication, which 
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generate latent semantic networks that convey their meaning (adapted 
from Hellsten et al., 2010).
The main premise of such automated approaches is that documents 
can be considered as a bag of words where a set of words is sufficient to 
understand the meaning of a text (e.g., Grimmer & Stewart, 2013). This 
idea is in line with the underlying theoretical assumptions of framing 
theory that “text contains frames, which are manifested by the presence 
or absence of certain keywords, stock phrases, stereotyped images, 
sources of information, and sentences” (Entman, 1993, p. 52; for a more 
detailed description of why frames can be analyzed in this way, see 
Grimmer & Stewart, 2013; Hellsten et al., 2010; Van der Meer, 2016a).
The automated approach requires several practical steps (Vlieger 
& Leydesdorff, 2011). In this study, frames were identified in all actors’ 
documents combined. First, a frequency list containing the 255 most 
frequently used words was created. Common/meaningless words, or-
ganizational names, and search strings were removed with a stop-word 
list, and words were reduced to their base forms. Second, after a manual 
revision, a document–term occurrence matrix was conducted. Third, 
the matrix was used to conduct principal component factor analysis. 
To maximize the variable loadings on each factor, Varimax rotation 
was selected. The retrieved components represent the frames. Through 
an iterative process, 11 meaningful frames were inductively identified. 
Finally, labels were assigned to the frames according to the words that 
are part of the word clusters that make up the frame.
Frame diversity. Research into communicative diversity (e.g., agen-
da diversity and frame diversity) relates to the idea that a difference 
in presence can be observed for a defined number of categories (e.g., 
Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015). In this study, frame presence was measured 
in the frequency of occurrence of each frame, in terms of articles that 
contained a particular frame.
To analyze the frequency of occurrence in U.S. news media, AmCat 
(the Amsterdam Content Analysis Toolkit; cf. van Atteveldt, 2008) was 
utilized. First, for each frame, a search string was created, combining the 
words that are part of the word clusters (or frame) in Apache Lucene 
query language with Boolean operators (AND, OR) and wildcards (*, ?). 
Words with factor loadings above .50 were combined with the operator 
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AND, and words relating to the same concept (e.g., traveler, passenger) 
combined with OR. The search queries were developed, tested, and 
improved using samples from the population to ensure the validity 
of the search strings. Second, all news documents were searched for 
the presence of these frames in AmCat. The tool kit construed a data 
matrix with rows representing the time (weekly level) and columns 
representing frame presence, indicating the variety of frames present in 
a given week. Third, to calculate frame presence and their prominence 
in relation to one another, the Shannon and Weaver (1949) entropy 
measure was used. This is a widely used measure for agenda and frame 
diversity (e.g., Huang, 2010; Jennings et al., 2011; Kleinnijenhuis et al., 
2015; Zhu & McCombs, 1995).
Frame alignment. The concept of frame alignment relates to the 
idea that different actors construct and use frames that differ in their 
level of similarity at certain points in time (Van der Meer et al., 2014). 
This study sets out to measure this similarity in framing by comparing 
frame presence across actors over time. In other words, by measuring 
the occurrence of a discrete number of frames for each actor in each 
defined time period, the presence of frames can be compared across 
actors.
This analysis is divided into several steps. First, the search strings 
that were described in the previous section were used to construe a 
data matrix in AmCat for each actor, with rows representing the time 
and columns indicating the frame presence. Second, a new data set was 
created from these matrices, where the cases represent the frames and a 
variable each actor for every week. The cases could take values of zero 
or any positive integer, with greater numbers representing a greater 
frame presence. Third, the extent to which a frame was present in the 
communication of both actors was tested by means of Pearson’s r cor-
relations tests, week by week. The correlation scores provided insight 
into the level of alignment over time.
Analysis
Partial adjustment autoregressive distribution lag (ADL) model. 
To test the influence of frames on frame diversity in news media 
(RQ2), a partial adjusted ADL (Koyck) model was estimated (data were 
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aggregated on a weekly level) with frame diversity as the dependent 
variable and news frames and attention as independent variables. Aug-
mented Dickey–Fuller test for unit root (stationarity) was conducted, 
and the series was tested for absence of autocorrelation in residuals 
(i.e., white noise).
Vector autoregression (VAR). Following previous research (e.g., 
Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015), a VAR model was estimated to test the causal 
RQ3. The analysis tests for bidirectional causality in time series data 
(aggregated on a weekly level) and consists of a series of ordinary least 
squares regressions in which each variable is treated as both dependent 
and independent variable (Vliegenthart, 2014). The model is based on 
Granger causality, where external causes should only be assumed when 
the own autoregressive past is not sufficient to explain a current value 
(Brandt & Williams, 2007). In this model estimation, each value is re-
gressed on its past value and the past value of the endogenous variable 
as well as the cross-lagged influence of other variables. The variable x is 
assumed to Granger-cause variable y if the prediction of y based on its 
previous values is improved by including the previous values of x into 
the equation (Brandt & Williams, 2007). Thus this analysis does not 
test for actual causation but whether the time series of x has predictive 
information about the time series of y.
News frame diversity and frame alignment served as endogenous 
variables, with news attention (i.e., number of news articles) as an 
exogenous variable to control for. The logarithm of the variable news 
frame diversity was entered into the model to account for nonnormal 
distributions. Dickey–Fuller tests were conducted to test for stationarity. 
The maximum number of lags was limited to three, with the assumption 
that a direct impact would only occur within 3 weeks or less (Vliegent-
hart, 2014). The final lag length included in the model was determined 
by the Akaike information criterion (e.g., Vliegenthart, 2014). Tests for 
the absence of autocorrelation (in residuals) were conducted.
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Results
Frames in Communication (RQ1)
A semantic network analysis was conducted that investigated the frames 
that were constructed by both actors. In total, 11 frames were identi-
fied and labeled, and their presence in communication was analyzed 
to answer RQ1. Table 1 displays the frame presence in communication 
from news media and GOs. In terms of frame presence, the results 
reveal that news media dominantly focused on the spreading virus 
and its related risks (contagion frame: 39.85%). To put it differently, the 
contagion frame is present in 39.85% of the newspaper articles sampled. 
In addition, frames about the pandemic outbreak in Africa (outbreak 
frame: 15.2%), the first U.S. case that intensified the crisis (intensifica-
tion frame: 16.22%), and the measures that need to be taken to protect 
patients and health personnel (protection frame: 12.6%) were high on 
the news media agenda. In contrast, GOs heavily emphasized the need 
for international support (support frame: 50.93%).
Moreover, GOs strongly focused on the development of the virus 
and its risk (contagion frame: 31.17%), the economic consequences of 
the crisis (consequence frame: 17.59%), and the pandemic outbreak 
center in Africa (outbreak frame: 10.8%). In sum, it becomes evident 
that while some frames are only (or more strongly) emphasized by the 
individual actors, others were high on both agendas (e.g., outbreak 
frame, contagion frame).
Frames and News Frame Diversity: Partial Adjusted ADL 
Model (RQ2)
To provide insight into framing dynamics during a crisis, the associa-
tion between the specific news frames and news frame diversity was 
analyzed, answering RQ2. The partial adjusted ADL model is presented 
in Table 2 with news frame diversity serving as the dependent vari-
able and a fraction of its past value and the identified news frames as 
independent variables. In addition, news attention is incorporated as 
a control variable in this analysis.
The reported coefficient of the autoregressive term (L. news frame 
diversity) indicates that news frame diversity was not an autoregressive 
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process (β = 0.05, p = .72), meaning that past values are not predictive 
of future values. Thus it seems that the development of frame diversity 
in news media over time was dynamic and random, corresponding 
to a degree of instability in the crisis development. In addition, the 
results provide evidence that the rise of certain frames can decrease 
the variety of frames present in news media coverage. More specifi-
cally, an increase in presence of the contagion frame in news media 
was associated with a significant decrease in news frame diversity 
(β = −1.63, p < .01). This suggests that when frames with words empha-
sizing the contagious nature of the virus, such as disease, spread, and 
infected, were increasingly present in the coverage, other frames were 
TABLE 2 Partial Adjustment Autoregressive Distribution Lag Model Predicting News 
Frame Diversity Based on Identified Frames
News frame diversity
L. news frame diversity 0.05 (0.141)
News frame
Support 0.51 (0.07)**
Victim 0.60 (0.08)**
Protection 0.37 (0.06)
Intensification −1.26 (0.40)*
Outbreak −0.28 (0.04)
Contagion −1.63 (0.04)**
Local infections −0.29 (0.05)
Politics 0.59 (0.07)
Prevention 0.10 (0.06)
Research 0.16 (0.12)
Consequences 0.11 (0.17)
News attention 1.70 (0.02)*
R2 0.58
Note. Cells contain standardized (β) regression coefficients with standard errors (SE). The 
independent trend variable and constant are absent from this table.
*p < 0.10. **p < .05.
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pushed from the media agenda. Similarly, a rise of the intensification 
frame in news media was associated with a decrease in frame diversity 
(β = −1.26, p < .10).
An opposite effect, however, is evident for other frames. The re-
sults reveal that greater presence of the support frame was associated 
with a significant increase in frame diversity in news media coverage 
(β = 0.51, p < .01). This demonstrates that when news reporting in-
creasingly made the need for the international support of the affected 
countries salient by using words such as support, countries, and com-
munity (support frame), the variety of frames also increased. Moreover, 
the results suggest that a rise in presence of the victim frame was also 
associated with a significant increase in news frame diversity in news 
coverage (β = 0.60, p < .01). Specifically, increasing emphasis in words 
such as family, sick, and Liberia in the news highlighting the need for 
help (victim frame) resulted in more heterogeneous framing in news 
media coverage. In sum, the findings of this analysis expose a fram-
ing process where the rise of certain frames pushes other frames from 
the agenda, thereby decreasing news frame diversity, whereas other 
frames seem to allow a plurality of frames in news media that coexist 
alongside each other.
Frame Alignment and News Frame Diversity: VAR Model 
(RQ3)
To explore the relationship between frame alignment and news frame 
diversity, a VAR model was estimated. Table 3 displays the estimated 
reciprocal effects of the two dependent variables. In addition, news at-
tention was included in the model as an exogenous variable. The model 
is absent of autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity, as indicated by the 
Ljung–Box Q test and the Lagrange multiplier test (Vliegenthart, 2014), 
revealing that the model is well specified. Moreover, the model explains 
a considerable amount of variance of both series, with an R2 value of 
.19 for new frame diversity and .41 for frame alignment.
The Granger causality test hints that frame alignment Granger-
causes news frame diversity, indicated by the significant effect. Hence 
the prediction of news frame diversity is increased by taking into ac-
count the level of frame alignment between the actors in the previous 
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week. A reversed effect of news frame diversity on frame alignment is 
not observed, indicating an asymmetrical relationship where only the 
time series of frame alignment contains information about the time 
series of frame diversity in news media coverage.
This is also reflected in Figure 1, which displays the times series for 
news frame diversity and frame alignment with transformed z-scores. 
The graph shows that changes in frame alignment often preceded 
changes in news frame diversity, which suggests that an increase (de-
crease) in frame alignment resulted in an increase (decrease) in news 
frame diversity. An impulse response function provides further insight. 
The function indicates that a 1-point increase in frame alignment trig-
gered an increase in .28 of news frame diversity in the following week. 
While the effect is positive and immediate, the impact of the effect 
declines slowly and gradually during the following weeks. In sum, the 
results indicate that when frames between actors become more similar, 
the diversity of frames in media increases. In other words, the results 
suggest that a level of shared interpretations between news media and 
GOs about what the crisis signifies resulted in more heterogeneous 
framing in news media reporting, thereby answering RQ3.
TABLE 3 Granger Causality Tests for Frame Alignment and News Frame Diversity
Frame alignment News frame diversity
Frame alignment: Granger 6.56*
News frame diversity 
Granger 0.19
Ljung–Box Q(20) 16.56 17.86
Lagrange M-test (20) 21.38 14.90
AIC 25.55
BIC 38.65
R2 0.19 0.41
Note. The model includes the news attention as an exogenous variable. The AIC suggests that 
a model with one lag is the most appropriate. AIC = Akaike information criterion. BIC = Bayes 
information criterion.
*p < .05.
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Discussion
The aim of this study was to shed light on the dynamic evolvement 
of frames in news media coverage of the Ebola crisis (2014–2015) and 
their interplay with frames promoted in GOs’ press releases. First, this 
study automatically identified frames that both actors had constructed 
(RQ1). The results reveal that frames such as the outbreak frame and 
contagion frame were salient in both actors’ communication. This seems 
to align with previous research that found that news media and their 
cited sources were predominantly alarming during the coverage of the 
A/H1N1 epidemic (Vasterman & Ruigrok, 2013). Perhaps these frames 
can be classified by their immediate character and could therefore be 
considered natural frames caused by the urgency and complexity that 
result from the occurrence of a crisis, explaining why these frames are 
prominent in the communication of both actors. At the same time, 
other frames were actor specific (e.g., GOs: support frame; U.S. news 
media: intensification frame), revealing differences in framing.
FIGURE 1. Times series for news frame diversity and frame alignment transformed to 
z-scores.
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The results suggest that frames that emphasized the perceived in-
tensification of the crisis due to the proximity of the Ebola infections 
(intensification frame, local infections frame) were strongly present in 
news media coverage but were largely absent from the GOs’ agenda. 
News coverage seemed to be heavily event driven and sensationalist, 
with a focus on the hospitalization of U.S. individuals. In contrast, GOs’ 
press releases seemed to have focused on local interventions (support 
frame) and broader economic consequences (consequences frame). 
Considering Iyengar’s (1991) previously applied typology of episodic 
and thematic frames, it seems news media coverage was more episodic 
compared to GOs’ press releases. While this stands in contrast to find-
ings of Lee and Basnyat (2013) in the context of the H1N1 crisis, it sup-
ports the results of Dudo et al. (2007) on the avian influenza coverage.
This might suggest that GOs paid little attention to local incidents, 
possibly because the millions of cases in West Africa outweighed the 
few U.S. infections. GOs might focus more strongly on providing 
detailed information that is cross-validated and placing the events in 
a broader global context (i.e., focus on thematic framing) rather than 
spreading the newest developments in the crisis that can potentially 
cause public panic. This explanation might indicate GOs’ awareness 
of their public function as an expert information source and regulator 
of public understanding.
Second, a partial adjusted ADL model was estimated, investigating 
the relationship between the presence of identified news frames and 
news frame diversity (RQ2). The results indicate that individual frames 
have the potential to narrow or widen the media’s scope of frames and 
therewith intensify or ease the crisis atmosphere (Kleinnijenhuis et 
al., 2015).
On one hand, news frame diversity was decreased by frames that 
emphasize the dramatic nature of the crisis and put specific events and 
individuals at the center of reporting. Specifically, with an increasing 
focus on the spread of the highly contagious virus (contagion frame) 
and the first infections within the United States (intensification frame), 
framing in news coverage became more homogenous. This observa-
tion is in line with previous research that has suggested that news 
coverage during health crises is driven by specific incidents (Dudo et 
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al., 2007; Shih et al., 2008) and that key events can lead to a focus on 
fewer, event-oriented frames (Scheufele, 2006). The drop in news frame 
diversity can, therefore, possibly be attributed to the intensification of 
the situation. A perceived crisis escalation might have resulted in a 
narrow focus (Suedfeld & Tetlock, 1977) and fostered a concentration 
on problems (e.g., Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015). Owing to the limited 
capacity of news media (Zhu, 1992; Zhu & McCombs, 1995), alternative 
viewpoints and interpretations remained absent, crowded out by these 
predominant negative and sensational frames (Entman, 2003). Thus the 
results also correspond with seminal research that has indicated that 
specific crisis frames have the potential to temporarily displace alterna-
tive interpretations (e.g., Geiß et al., 2016) and conceal narratives that 
promote alternative solutions to epidemics, such as local interventions 
in Africa, that are context specific and address long-term implications 
(Leach et al., 2010).
On the other hand, a rising emphasis on frames that focus more 
strongly on the crisis progress and highlight the help needed for victims 
(i.e., support frame and victim frame) increased news frame diversity. 
This suggests that with the increasing presence of more constructive 
news frames that emphasized the importance of supporting the affected 
countries (support frame) and highlighted the impact of the crisis on a 
broader scope (victim frame), the variety of narratives and interpreta-
tion also increased. These latter frames seem to have made the process 
and development of the crisis salient from a wider and more inclusive 
perspective, emphasizing the global scale of the events and introducing 
possible solutions into coverage. Perhaps, these frames could therefore 
be considered progressive frames. This effect might be related to a 
progressing dialogue and exchange of information. Previous research 
has observed that with the advancement of the crisis, news media 
coverage became less alarming (Vasterman & Ruigrok, 2013) and more 
open to a diverse set of narratives (Kleinnijenhuis et al., 2015), which 
increased diversity and fostered a variety of perspectives on the situa-
tion (Wong et al., 2011). Thus it may be that as the news media turned 
to the discussion of solutions, frame diversity increased. An alternative 
explanation, however, should not be neglected. It is also plausible that 
the presence of these two frames simply coincided with phases of higher 
Crisis Frame Dynamics 171
frame diversity in news media reporting, which created the necessary 
space in coverage for these alternative perspectives to arise.
Finally, a VAR model was estimated to analyze the relationship 
between the level of frame alignment between actors and news frame 
diversity (RQ3). The underlying question was whether heterogeneity 
in perspectives in news media (high news frame diversity) creates the 
basis for shared understanding about the events across actors (frame 
alignment) or if a degree of shared interpretation of the crisis is at 
the core of the media being open for a variety of interpretations. The 
model provides evidence that an increase in frame alignment between 
GOs and media produced greater frame diversity in news media. The 
direction of the relationship seems to suggest that in the development 
of a crisis, a degree of mutual understanding between actors about the 
meaning of the events (Hellsten et al., 2010; Snow et al., 2007; Van der 
Meer et al., 2014) is instrumental for news media to open up for diverse 
narratives. Specifically, the rapprochement between the frames that 
were offered by GOs and the frames present in news media coverage 
appeared to have had a soothing effect on the news media coverage, 
triggering a phase in which a variety of alternative information and 
perspective were covered in the news. In times of crisis, news media 
seem to reflect the social negotiation of how to frame the critical situ-
ation at play rather than lead how to interpret and communicate about 
the crisis. The degree of alignment might have served as an indicator 
for involved actors that a degree of consensus had been reached (Van 
der Meer et al., 2014), the situation de-escalated (Weick, 1988), and 
crisis atmosphere can ease.
The results of this study contribute to the body of literature on crisis 
communication as well as framing theory and have certain practical 
implications. First, the findings enrich the crisis literature by providing 
further insight into the dynamic news media crisis coverage and how it 
was affected by interaction with GOs. Epidemic outbreaks are dynamic 
and complex processes with a variety of competing narratives (Leach et 
al., 2010). This study applied time series analysis to provide insight into 
the interaction of different frames, thereby answering the call for a more 
complex and dynamic investigation of the communicative interplay 
between actors in times of crisis (e.g., Schultz et al., 2012). Second, this 
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study contributes to the literature on an empirical level by proposing 
an innovative way to quantify the presence of automatically identified 
frames in a large number of texts. In contrast to the majority of previ-
ous framing research on epidemics, this study followed an inductive 
approach to identify frames, enabling the recognition of the full variety 
of frames specific to the Ebola crisis (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). 
Future health crisis research might benefit from applying a similar ap-
proach to identify frames unique to the crisis under study. Third, by 
focusing on organizations from the public sector, this study started to 
fill an important gap and enhances understanding of GOs’ interaction 
with news media in times of crisis (Liu & Horsley, 2007; Schultz & 
Raupp, 2010). Based on the results, it seems GOs need to recognize 
the zero-sum dynamic in media coverage where narratives focusing 
on the immediate problems of the crisis are likely to dominate news 
media coverage. This narrow focus might have adverse consequences 
for the crisis atmosphere and can hinder the emergence of solutions. 
However, news media coverage appears to become more inclusive of 
alternative narratives with the emergence of common interpretations 
across actors. Thus GOs might benefit from adjusting their communi-
cation and signal acknowledgment of the immediate problems early to 
allow a communicative shift toward an alternative more encompassing 
discourse. By aligning their framing and crisis interpretations to the 
news media coverage, GOs could stimulate an increase in frame diver-
sity in news media coverage and thereby soothe the crisis atmosphere.
While this study makes some valuable contributions, a number of 
shortcomings must be considered when interpreting the results. First, 
the findings relate to a specific context of study, namely, Ebola in the 
years 2014 and 2015 reported in U.S. newspapers, which limits its gen-
eralizability. Second, this study did not differentiate between U.S.-based 
and international health organizations. Thus future research could 
analyze whether different framing dynamics can be observed between 
them. Third, the automated analysis started from the assumption that 
bags of words are sufficient to retrieve the general meaning of the text. 
Although this neglecting of syntax enables analyzing a large number of 
texts (Grimmer & Stewart, 2013), it risks obscuring information. Finally, 
despite the automatic identification of frames, the analysis faced a degree 
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of subjective interference because frame presence was identified based 
on manually created search strings. The method chosen to determine 
the strings resulted, for some frames, in a limited number and selec-
tive combination of words, which might have influenced the findings. 
Therefore future research should validate the results and see whether 
the findings of the Ebola crisis also hold in other crisis situations.
Conclusion
To conclude, this study provides insight into the underlying commu-
nicative dynamics between news media and GOs that influence the 
construction and evolvement of crises over time. Results of analyzing 
the concepts of news frame diversity and frame alignment in commu-
nicative interplay during crisis demonstrate that shared interpretations 
seem to foster the openness of news media for varying narratives. 
Therefore timely and constructive communicative interaction between 
the news media and GOs seems to have a soothing effect on news 
media coverage.
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ABSTRACT
Fear of infectious disease has the potential to damage local economies, disrupt health care de-
livery systems, and diminish immune functioning, whether or not the risk is objectively high. The 
appearance of Ebola in the United States off ered an opportunity to study the causes of fear in a 
real-world event. Shortly after the death of the fi rst Ebola patient diagnosed in the United States, 
survey data were gathered (N = 849) from residents of Dallas and U.S. citizens outside of Texas. 
Fear was positively associated with age (younger), gender (female), and ethnicity (non-White), but 
not geographic proximity (Dallas vs. not Dallas). Exposure to Ebola-related information via inter-
personal channels (friends/family, acquaintances/coworkers) corresponded with higher levels of 
fear, but the fi ndings for media channels were more varied, showing positive eff ects (newspapers/
magazines), negative eff ects (Internet), and null eff ects (TV/radio). The study provides insight into 
the personal, interpersonal, and media correlates of fear of Ebola.
KEYWORDS: Fear; media; interpersonal; communication; infectious disease; Ebola
Although infectious diseases can produce devastating biological eff ects, 
nonbiologic outcomes may be equally consequential (Lempel, Epstein, 
& Hammond, 2009). Fear can decrease immune functioning, produce 
delays in care seeking, and damage the local economy (Van Bortel et 
al., 2016). Furthermore, such eff ects may occur whether or not fear of 
the disease is objectively justifi ed (Smith, 2006).
These observations underscore the importance of understanding 
fear as a potential health problem in its own right. Surprisingly, only 
a handful of studies have considered fear as the focus of investigation 
(e.g., Nelissen, Beullens, Lemal, & van den Bulck, 2015). The 2014 arrival 
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of Ebola in the United States presented an opportunity to address this 
understudied issue by examining fear in response to a public health 
crisis, notably, one that experts believed posed almost no danger to 
the public at large.
The project embraced three broad questions. The first, concerned 
with audience segmentation, focused on person-level correlates of fear. 
Given the possibility of affective disparities, we tested for associations 
between fear and gender, age, ethnicity, and proximity to the threat. 
Second, in light of the intense news coverage of Ebola, we considered 
the relationship between media exposure and fear. To complete the 
picture (third), we examined the role of interpersonal communica-
tion. This was justified on the grounds that individuals often share 
information about their emotional states and the causes thereof (Rimé, 
2007). Our overarching goal was to produce a layered analysis of the 
correlates of fear.
A Brief History of Ebola in the United States
Ebola produces a range of symptoms that include internal and exter-
nal hemorrhaging (World Health Organization, 2015) and an average 
case fatality rate of 50%. The outbreak that began in Africa in March 
2014 eventually developed into the largest epidemic of Ebola in history 
(Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2015). By summer of that 
year, the epidemic began to draw increased attention from the U.S. press 
and government that continued to grow in subsequent months. In a 
September 16 press release, Lamar Alexander, senior Republican on 
the Senate’s health committee, said, “This is one of the most explosive, 
dangerous, deadly epidemics in modern times. . . . There is no known 
cure. Half of those who get sick die” (U.S. Senate Committee on Health, 
Education, Labor, and Pensions, 2014).
On September 30, 2014, Eric Thomas Duncan, a resident of Dallas 
who had been traveling in Liberia, tested positive for Ebola. He died 8 
days later. Duncan’s two nurses, Nina Pham and Amber Vinson, con-
tracted the disease and became the second and third cases of Ebola in 
the United States. What followed has been described as a media frenzy 
(Bruinius, 2014). Indeed, media sources frequently used the phrase 
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“epidemic of fear” to describe the mood of the country (e.g., Gilsinan, 
2014). A Washington Post story reported that “this is both a biological 
plague and a psychological one, and fear can spread even faster than 
the virus” (Sun, Dennis, Bernstein, & Achenbach, 2014). Collectively, 
these events warrant characterization of the situation as a megacrisis 
(Sellnow-Richmond, George, & Sellnow, 2018). Figure 1 illustrates 
media coverage of the disease along with notable Ebola-related events.
The Nature and Effects of Fear
Fear is a negatively valenced emotion that follows from the perception 
that one is at risk of harm (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). It is indexed in 
the English language by a family of terms that range from worried to 
terrified. Synonyms that lie near the center of the intensity continuum 
include scared, afraid, and frightened (Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988).1 At 
moderate levels, fear provides the motivational basis for self-protective 
behaviors, such as information seeking (Kim & Niederdeppe, 2013). 
But, when fear becomes more intense, it can constrict the perceptual 
FIGURE 1 Timeline of Ebola events and media coverage. In the LexisNexis Academic News 
Sources database, we searched for articles with “Ebola” as keyword in both the title and the 
body in U.S. newspapers from August 20 to October 29, 2014. To assess trends in media 
coverage, we gathered data about the total number of Ebola-related news stories for 10-day 
periods. The results are plotted as data points and connected with lines.
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field and preclude longer range thinking. Some writers have asserted 
that infectious diseases may have special power to instill fright because 
viral agents are invisible, colorless, and odorless (Alcabes, 2009). The 
inability to directly perceive the threat can escalate worry into intense 
fear and dread (Alcabes, 2009).
Problems associated with fear of infectious disease play out at three 
levels (Van Bortel et al., 2016). Among individuals, fear may interfere 
with the ability to perform one’s job and to successfully enact social 
relationships (Tamir, 2016), as well as decrease job satisfaction and 
increase stress (Hartley, Davila, Marquart, & Mullings, 2013). Fear and 
related disorders, such as posttraumatic stress syndrome, have also been 
associated with diminished cardiovascular fitness (Suls & Bunde, 2005), 
decreased immune system functioning (Segerstrom, Solomon, Kemeny, 
& Fahey, 1998), and degraded psychological health (Silver et al., 2013). 
At the community level, fear can accelerate the spread of disease (Schulz 
et al., 2016), cause delays in care seeking (Yamanis, Nolan, & Shepler, 
2016), disrupt health care delivery systems (Barrett & Brown, 2008), 
and diminish trust in health services (Van Bortel et al., 2016). Fear can 
also produce unwanted outcomes at the state and national levels. For 
instance, areas impacted by infectious diseases may experience loss 
of investment and decreased tourism/travel (Lempel et al., 2009). In 
sum, fear has the potential to produce seriously undesirable outcomes 
depending on its intensity.
Personal Predictors of Fear: Demographics
It is generally accepted that there is value in understanding responses 
to disasters via demographic grouping (Liu, Fraustino, & Jin, 2017). 
Certain demographic variables have been associated with perceived 
risk and emotional response. One is gender. Men perceive lower levels 
of risk relative to women, a finding that is typically attributed to socio-
political factors rather than biology or knowledge deficits (Finucane, 
Slovic, Mertz, Flynn, & Satterfield, 2000; Flynn, Slovic, & Mertz, 1994). 
Similarly, recent work has found that men report lower levels of fear to 
a variety of stimuli. This relationship holds even after controlling for 
gender role adherence (Campbell et al., 2016).
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Age, another demographic descriptor, generally shows an inverse 
correlation with intensity of negative affect (Charles, Reynolds, & 
Gatz, 2001). Socioemotional selectivity theory explains this relation-
ship in terms of greater motivation to down-regulate negative feelings 
(Carstensen, 2006). In contrast, the strength and vulnerability inte-
gration model emphasizes ability. Presumably, older individuals are 
more skilled at emotion regulation than their younger counterparts 
(Charles, 2010).
There is also evidence that ethnicity corresponds with perceived 
risk and emotional response. Whites generally perceive lower levels of 
environmental risk compared to non-Whites (Finucane et al., 2000; 
Flynn et al., 1994), and following disasters, Whites show lower levels 
of sadness, which is typically correlated with fear, than non-Whites 
(Chu, Seery, Ence, Holman, & Silver, 2006). It has been argued that the 
tendency for persons of African descent (vs. Whites) to report higher 
levels of affect can be explained in terms of cultural differences that 
place a higher value on emotions and emotional expression (White & 
Parham, 1990).
The goal of this study was not to evaluate competing explanations 
for these findings. Rather, we aimed to assess whether the same de-
mographic variables might be useful for identifying segments of the 
population that are especially prone to fear of infectious disease. Purely 
on the basis of prior findings, the following was expected:
H1: Fear is negatively associated with (a) gender (male), (b) age, and 
(c) ethnicity (White).
Personal Predictors of Fear: Proximity
Appraisal theories of emotion posit an explicit causal sequence that 
leads to emotion arousal (Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991). First, some change 
takes place in the environment. Next, the individual appraises the im-
plications of the change for his or her well-being. Assuming that the 
change is seen as relevant, some emotion results, the type and intensity 
of which depend on other appraisals. Fear, for example, requires that 
the individual see the change as involving impending danger.
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Reason suggests that geographic proximity to a threat should en-
hance fear, probably due to perceptions of increased susceptibility and, 
perhaps, severity. Research has borne this out. Ruiz and Hernandez 
(2014) found that residents of the Canary Islands who were closer to 
a volcanic eruption reported higher fear than those who were more 
distant. Other studies have shown that fear increases as a function of 
physical proximity to acts of terrorism (Holman, Garfin, & Silver, 2014; 
Stitka, Bauman, & Mullen, 2004). Furthermore, analysis of Twitter data 
revealed that the percentage of tweets expressing fear in countries with 
confirmed cases of Ebola was higher than in adjacent countries, which 
was higher than in distant countries (Zhuang, Peng, & Tang, 2018). 
Given the appearance of Ebola in Dallas and the failure of the health 
care system there to contain the disease, we anticipated that residents 
of Dallas would experience higher levels of fear than persons in other 
parts of the United States:
H2: Fear is positively associated with physical proximity to the threat.
Media and Interpersonal Predictors of Fear
It is possible for individuals to encounter hazards, such as infectious 
disease, by contracting the malady themselves or by directly observing 
its effects in others. This was true for the health professionals in Texas 
who cared for Eric Thomas Duncan, Nina Pham, and Amber Vinson. 
However, we suspect that it is more common for people to learn about 
health threats from other people (including media) than directly. This 
was the case for the millions of Americans who did not have direct 
contact with Duncan, Pham, or Vinson. Thus it seems quite likely that 
risk appraisal and the fear that follows from it are shaped by a variety 
of indirect social processes. The social amplification of risk model 
holds that individuals, groups, and institutions can act as amplification 
stations that serve to amplify or attenuate risk perception when they 
communicate about the hazard (Kasperson, Kasperson, Pidgeon, & 
Slovic, 2003).2 Two such stations are media and interpersonal networks. 
An abundance of research has shown that frequency of exposure to 
risk information via mediated or interpersonal channels is a positive 
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predictor of fear and/or risk. For instance, a meta-analysis of cultivation 
research reported that frequency of exposure to television is positively 
associated with perception of real-world violence (Morgan & Shanahan, 
1997). Other work has indicated a positive relationship between media 
exposure and health-related risk estimation (Coleman, 1993; Morton & 
Duck, 2001), perceived disease severity (Young, Norman, & Humphreys, 
2008), fear of cancer (Nelissen et al., 2015), and fear of terrorism (Nellis 
& Savage, 2012; Silver et al., 2013). Shrum (2008) offered a cognitive 
explanation for such effects when he asserted that frequency of activa-
tion is sufficient to enhance the accessibility of constructs in memory. 
On this view, concepts become stronger and more easily activated as 
a function of frequency of activation:
H3: Fear is positively associated with frequency of exposure to threat-
related information via media channels.
Although there are many ways to define interpersonal communica-
tion, it is commonly conceived to be interaction between two individuals 
that takes place in real time (cf. Solomon & Theiss, 2013). Compared 
to media research on risk and fear, findings regarding the effects of 
interpersonal communication are fewer in number and less consistent. 
For instance, Coleman (1993) found discussion effects for certain social 
risks but not for personal risks, whereas Trumbo (1996) reported that 
risk perceptions were driven by frequency of interpersonal discussion 
only among individuals who are predisposed toward amplification of 
risk. Work that assessed the perceived risks and benefits of a biologi-
cal research facility showed frequency effects on benefits, but not risks 
(Binder, Scheufele, Brossard, & Gunther, 2011). Thus, while the existing 
literature is hardly univocal, there is evidence of frequency effects for 
interpersonal discussion. The precise mechanism by which these effects 
occur may be debated, but the simplest explanation is that message 
repetition about a risky topic is sufficient to evoke fear regardless of 
channel. As with mediated messages, frequency of concept activation 
increases construct accessibility. Consequently, we make the following 
hypothesis:
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H4: Fear is positively associated with frequency of exposure to threat-
related information via interpersonal channels.
Complexities in the Prediction of Fear?
Prior research has indicated that interpersonal communication may 
interact with media exposure to alter individuals’ knowledge, atti-
tudes, or behaviors, either by amplifying the impact of media or by 
dampening it (e.g., Hardy & Scheufele, 2005; Scheufele, 2000, 2001, 
2002; Southwell & Yzer, 2007, 2009). For example, Southwell (2005) 
found that the positive relationship between adolescents’ exposure to 
an antidrug advertisement and their memory of it was moderated by 
interpersonal communications about the ad. Those who talked more 
about the ad remembered the ad content better. Similarly, interpersonal 
communication with family and friends has been shown to interact 
with Internet and television use to affect healthy lifestyle behaviors 
(Lee, 2009). Although previous research has seldom tested for this in-
teraction on emotional response, it is plausible given that interpersonal 
conversations can amplify perceived risk. Thus we ask the following:
RQ1: Does interpersonal communication moderate the relationship 
between media exposure and fear of Ebola?
Although proximity to the outbreak of an infectious disease might 
be expected to create more intense fear responses, that may not be the 
only effect of location. Indeed, it seems likely that media tasked with 
reporting on local news might give greater coverage to the event than 
would national news. And residents of the city where the outbreak has 
occurred could be more inclined to discuss the matter with friends, 
family, and coworkers than would individuals at far remove. These 
higher levels of communication might differ in content or emphasis, 
making the threat appear more immediate or severe. These possibilities 
raise the following question:
RQ2: Is fear partially determined by an interaction between proximity 
and message exposure (media, interpersonal, or both)?
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Method
Sample and Participants
Participants were members of Qualtrics’s opt-in, online survey panel. 
They received an invitation to participate via e-mail; provided data 
between October 21 and 29, 2014 (cf. Figure 1); then subsequently 
received compensation. As is generally the case with opt-in panels, 
response rate cannot be assessed because the number of invitations 
exceeds the a priori designated sample size. Once the target sample 
size is reached, the survey closes, and it is not known how many more 
participants would have accepted had it remained open.
Screening questions ensured that approximately half of the sample 
resided in the Dallas metropolitan area, whereas the remainder was 
balanced across census regions in the continental United States (but 
not including Texas). With the elimination of the 16 persons who spent 
more than 2 hours or fewer than 2 min completing the survey, the final 
sample (N = 849) was 46% male and 54% female, ranging in age from 
18 to 64 years (M = 40.59, SD = 14.01). As to ethnic identification, 74% 
of participants identified as White, 14% as Black or African American, 
9% as Hispanic, 5% as Asian or Pacific Islander, 3% as Native American 
TABLE 1 Comparison of Dallasites and Non-Dallasites
Dallasites Non-Dallasites t or χ2 p-Value
Age (mean in years)
Sample statistics 41 39 1.27 0.20
Population census data 32 37
Gender (male; %)
Sample statistics 55 37 27.33 <0.001
Population census data 50 50
Ethnicity (White; %)
Sample statistics 71 78 5.13 0.02
Population census data 51 77
Note. Census data in the Non-Dallasites column are based on the entire United States, including 
Dallas. Census data on age for both Dallasites and non-Dallasites are median values in 2014.
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or American Indian, and 2% as “other,” without specifying their ethnic-
ity. Six percent of the participants identified with multiple ethnicities. 
There were 417 respondents from the Dallas metropolitan area and 
432 from outside of Texas. Table 1 presents demographic comparisons 
of the two groups with one another and with census data. The study 
was approved by the Institutional Review Board at Pennsylvania State 
University.
Statistical Power
Assuming α = .05, two-tailed, and N = 849, power to detect a bivari-
ate effect equal to r of .10 was .83. Thus the study possessed adequate 
power to detect small effects.
Measurement
Demographics. Participants provided information on their gender 
(male = 1; female = 0), ethnicity (White = 1; non-White = 0), and age 
in years.
Proximity. A screening question asked respondents whether or not 
they lived in Dallas. Responses were verified against longitude and 
latitude data provided by Qualtrics. Location was a binary variable, 
where Dallas = 1 and not Dallas = −1.
Message exposure via media and interpersonal channels. Level 
of exposure was estimated by asking respondents to estimate how of-
ten they have encountered information, in the past couple of months, 
about Ebola in newspapers or magazines; on television or radio; on the 
Internet; in conversation with friends or family; and in conversation 
with acquaintances, coworkers, or strangers. Judgments were made 
on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (never) to 5 (more than 10 times). An 
index of interpersonal communication of Ebola information was cre-
ated by averaging the two interpersonal channel items given that they 
were moderately correlated (r = .66, α = .80) and their relationships 
with other variables were parallel.
Fear. Using a response scale ranging from 0 (none of this emotion) 
to 4 (a great deal of this emotion), respondents were asked to mark the 
numerical values that best indicated how the current news about Ebola 
made them feel. Two items were drawn from a larger set of items whose 
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validity had been established in previous research (Dillard & Shen, 
2006). Given strong correlations with the latent variable fear (in those 
studies), it was determined that two items were sufficient to create a 
reliable index. Thus, to minimize respondent fatigue, we utilized only 
afraid and scared (α = .91).
Results
Descriptive Results
As shown in Table 2, on a 0–4 scale, the mean value for fear was 1.62. 
However, the sample showed responses across the full range of the 
scale. For the five Ebola-related message exposure variables, the means 
ranged from 2.86 to 3.99 on a 1–5 scale, which suggested medium to 
high levels of exposure to Ebola-related information.
Model Fitting
Two regression analyses were conducted with fear as the dependent 
variable. In both cases, the person variables were entered first as a block, 
followed by the mean-centered measures of mediated and interpersonal 
message exposure variables in the second block. In one analysis, the 
third block contained interaction terms for media and interpersonal 
exposure variables. In the other analysis, the third block contained 
product terms for location (+1/−1), with each of the mean-centered 
exposure indices. The results are given in Table 3.
TABLE 2 Descriptive Statistics
M (SD) 1 2 3 4 5
1. Newspapers/mags 2.86a (1.51) –
2. TV/radio 3.99a (1.27) 0.36* –
3. Internet 3.68a (1.37) 0.40* 0.34* –
4. Interpersonal  
  communication
3.12a (1.23) 0.44* 0.44* 0.50* 0.80
5. Fear 1.62b (1.28) 0.13* 0.01 0.02 0.15* 0.91
Note. N = 849. Values in the diagonal are Cronbach’s alpha.
a Possible range = 1–5. b Possible range = 0–4.
*p < .001.
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Hypothesis Tests
H1a, which predicted a negative association with gender, was supported. 
The standardized coefficient, β = −.12, p = .001, indicated that men 
reported lower levels of fear than women. H1b anticipated a negative 
relationship between age and fear. With β = −.07, p = .039, the hypoth-
esis was supported. Older respondents experienced fear less intensely 
TABLE 3 Regression Analyses Predicting Fear
Block Predictor B 95% CI β R R2Δ
1 Gender (male) −.31 −.48, 
−.13
−.12** .17 .03***
Age −.01 −.01, 
−.000
−.07*
Ethnicity (White) −.19 −.39, 
.004
−.07+
Proximity (Dallas) −.05 −.14, .04 −.04
2 Newspapers/mags .10 .03, .16 .11** .26 .04***
TV/radio −.04 −.12, .04 −.04
Internet −.11 −.18, 
−.03
−.12**
Interpersonal .19 .10, .28 .18***
3a Interpersonal × 
Newspapers/Mags
.04 −.01, .09 −.06 .27 .004
Interpersonal × TV/Radio .01 −.06, .07 .01
Interpersonal × Internet −.04 −.11, .02 −.06
3b Proximity × Newspapers/
Mags
−.01 −.08, .06 −.01 .28 .002
Proximity × TV/Radio .01 −.07, .09 .01
Proximity × Internet .03 −.05, .10 .03
Proximity × Interpersonal −.01 −.11, .08 −.01
Note. N = 849. Regression coefficients in Block 1 were estimated using only predictors in that 
block. The Block 2 estimates are based on the full set of predictors in Blocks 1 and 2. Similarly, 
Block 3 estimates are based on all prior blocks.
+p = .055. *p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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than their younger counterparts. H1c predicted a negative coefficient 
for ethnicity, which was borderline significant, β = −.07, p = .055.
H2 specified a positive association between proximity to the outbreak 
and fear. Because the observed difference between Dallas residents and 
nonresidents was not significant, β = −.04, p = .277, this hypothesis was 
not supported.
H3 predicted positive associations between fear and indices of me-
dia exposure. The regression analysis estimated these relationships as 
follows: for newspapers/magazines, β = .12, p = .003; for TV/radio, β = 
−.04, p = .341; for Internet, β = −.12, p = .005. Support for H3 was mixed.
Similarly, H4 anticipated positive effects for interpersonal exposure 
on fear. Indeed, exposure to Ebola information via interpersonal chan-
nels significantly predicted fear, β = .18, p < .001. Thus H4 was supported.
RQ1 focused on the interaction effects between interpersonal and 
media exposure to Ebola messages (see Block 3a in Table 3). We used 
the mean-centered interpersonal and media exposure variables to cre-
ate the interaction terms (product terms). R2 change for the block was 
.004, p = .351. None of the terms was significant. Thus there was no 
interaction effect of message exposure on fear via different channels.
RQ2 examined the potential for proximity and message exposure 
to interact in their effect on fear. Block 3b of Table 3 assessed the data 
for these interactions. R2 change for the block was .002, p = .839, and 
none of the individual terms was significant. Thus message exposure 
effects were not conditioned on location.
Discussion
The Intensity of Fear
A majority of our sample (80%) reported experiencing some degree of 
fear (i.e., >0 on a 0–4 scale). Yet, the mean value of 1.62 seemed rather 
modest and not in keeping with news characterizations of the public 
mood as an “epidemic of fear and anxiety” (Harlan, 2014). To put these 
values in perspective, it may be useful to consider two points of refer-
ence. On one hand, levels of fear and perceived threat in the data were 
comparable to the SARS outbreak in 2003 and the H1N1 pandemic 
in 2009. In both cases, more than half of the Americans surveyed 
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indicated that they were not that worried about the threat (Moore, 2003; 
Pew Research Center, 2003, 2009; Saad, 2009). From this, it seemed 
sensible to conclude that the Ebola crisis was nontrivial but that media 
interpretations of it were overblown.
On the other hand, Americans were far more concerned than they 
should have been. The level of fear reported by our sample might be 
viewed as a vast overreaction to the true risk posed by Ebola. Indeed, 
one Internet meme held that Americans were more likely to marry a 
Kardashian (n = 3) than to die from Ebola (n = 1). According to health 
experts (e.g., Friedman & Schapiro, 2014), the Kardashian comparison 
was reasonably accurate. Thus the series of events was psychologically 
significant for many members of the public, despite the fact that high 
levels of fear were not objectively justified.
Personal Predictors of Fear: Demographics
Demographic variables were included in this study to determine wheth-
er fear varied as a function of group membership. On this point, the 
data provided some reasonably clear answers. Persons who were fe-
male, younger, and non-White all showed heightened levels of fear of 
Ebola. These results are consistent with prior research showing that 
membership in these categories is associated with higher fear levels 
for other sorts of adverse events (e.g., Campbell et al., 2016; Charles, 
Reynolds, & Gatz, 2001; Chu et al., 2006). To the extent that Ebola is 
representative of other infectious diseases, this provides a rationale for 
demographically targeted communication efforts designed to reduce 
public fear during times of crisis.
The results also suggest the existence of a heretofore unidentified 
form of health disparity, one based on emotional response. Members of 
these demographically defined groups, and especially those who belong 
to multiple categories, are at relatively greater risk for the subjective 
experience of fear as well as downstream effects, such as diminished 
biological and psychological health (Segerstrom et al., 1998; Silver 
et al., 2013).
There is, however, one important qualification to these conclu-
sions. Because our sample was 74% White, we were unable to provide 
meaningful tests of differences among minority groups (which have 
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been observed in some previous work, e.g., Chu et al., 2006). More 
research is needed to better understand the prevalence and basis of 
group differences.
Personal Predictors of Fear: Proximity
A proximity effect was anticipated, such that Dallasites would be more 
frightened than persons living outside of Texas. Because the data did 
not show the expected effect, we considered alternative explanations. 
One was that media content varied in ways that dampened fear in Dal-
las or exacerbated it outside of Texas. With the aim of exploring this 
possibility, we searched for, but did not find, systematic comparisons 
of communication content in Dallas versus not Dallas. However, an 
analysis of one Canadian and one Nigerian newspaper offered an ana-
log (Humphries, Radice, & Lauzier, 2017). Two consistent themes in 
the Canadian paper, which was geographically distant from the threat 
of Ebola, were an emphasis on global responsibility for combating 
the disease and the need for the Canadian government to stop Ebola 
before it spread into Western nations. The Nigerian paper, in contrast, 
focused on the risks of Ebola and the actions undertaken locally to 
safeguard the population. In addition, the Nigerian outlet more fre-
quently critiqued Western coverage of Ebola as sensationalistic and 
actively resisted perceived stigmatization of Nigerians. In other words, 
the Canadian “outsider” paper framed Ebola more reactively, whereas 
the Nigerian “insider” publication gave greater emphasis to action 
and ingroup solidarity. Although our reasoning is obviously specula-
tive, if the same communication dynamics were at work in our U.S. 
sample, they may have been responsible for the absence of a proximity 
effect in the data.
Another possibility is that precisely the opposite occurred; that is, 
rather than different locales producing different content, it is conceiv-
able that news coverage did not vary. On this view, the Ebola crisis was 
treated by all news outlets as a national issue, and the public, regardless 
of location, perceived it as such. This account aligns well with Holman 
et al.’s (2014) data. Their work on the Boston Marathon bombing found 
no effect for physical proximity on acute stress symptoms but a posi-
tive, linear effect for media exposure. Together, the two results suggest 
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a media environment that defines the crisis broadly enough to override 
the influence of geography. 
Both possibilities are compatible with one broader point. Although 
we thought it plausible that individuals closer to the threat would see 
themselves as more susceptible to it (and therefore experience greater 
fear), physical distance is not synonymous with psychological distance 
(Trope & Liberman, 2010). Going forward, researchers may wish to 
examine factors that moderate the correspondence between these two 
related but independent forms of distance.
Media and Interpersonal Predictors of Fear
The social amplification of risk model asserts that amplification stations 
function to modulate perceptions of risk, by either magnification or 
minimization. Our results are intriguing in that they demonstrate effects 
of both sorts as well as a null effect for TV/radio. As for amplification, 
frequency of exposure via newspapers/magazines showed the antici-
pated positive association with fear. This result echoes findings from 
many previous studies that reported an influence of media exposure 
on risk (e.g., Coleman, 1993; Young et al., 2008) but joins a relatively 
small number of investigations that found a parallel effect on fear 
(Nelissen et al., 2015; Silver et al., 2013). Interpersonal communication 
also showed positive relationships such that more frequent exposure 
to Ebola-related communication led to higher levels of fear of Ebola.
The observed effect of exposure is compatible with theories of 
memory that hold that semantically related words or concepts co-occur 
with the target more easily and frequently (Anderson, 1983; Dosher & 
Rosedale, 1989). Repeated exposure to the same stimuli has been found 
to facilitate memory of the stimuli—a phenomenon known as repetition 
priming (Logan, 1990). According to these theories, simple mention of 
Ebola should be sufficient to activate the cognitive appraisals that are 
responsible for fear.
That simple account is challenged, however, by the findings for TV/
radio, which showed no detectable association with fear, and for Internet 
exposure, which was negatively correlated with fear. At the broadest 
level, these results are important in that they empirically illustrate the 
potential for different amplification stations to produce countervailing 
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(or no) effects for a specific threat. Although it is unclear whether this 
pattern of results is unique to Ebola or generalizable to other infectious 
diseases, it underscores the need to consider the interplay of influences 
within and across the categories of interpersonal and mediated com-
munication.
At a more specific level, the study showed that newspapers/maga-
zines were positively associated with fear, whereas Internet usage pro-
duced a negative association. While a definitive account of the findings 
is not possible, personal agency and message content may both play 
a role. In contrast to the sensationalism of corporate media, active 
seekers of information about Ebola may have sought and found—via 
the Internet—credible sources of health information, most which were 
saying that the risk of Ebola in the United States was vanishingly small 
(Friedman & Schapiro, 2014).
Complex Influences on Fear?
No interpersonal/media interaction effect was observed in this study. 
In other words, there was no indication that conversations about Ebola 
magnified or minimized the impact of media exposure on fear. Natu-
rally, this raises the question of why interaction effects appear in some 
studies (e.g., Lee, 2009) and not others (e.g., the current project). 
Simply posing this question highlights a lacuna in the research litera-
ture. Although the possibility of interpersonal/media interactions has 
been raised, there is currently no theory designed to explain when or 
why such effects should be expected. Because research has suggested 
multiple factors that might govern the effect—message function, for-
mat, timing, topic, and network density (Southwell & Yzer, 2009)—it 
is clear that constructing such a theory will be a nontrivial, but much 
needed, undertaking.
In a similar vein, we considered the possibility that location would 
interact with message exposure. None of the four tests was signifi-
cant. Although Ebola-related message exposure was generally higher 
in Dallas versus outside of Texas, there was no indication that the 
exposure–fear association varied in strength as a function of location. 
This null effect could be due to Ebola being seen as a national rather 
than local phenomenon at the time of our investigation. Indeed, many 
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newsworthy events took place beyond the Texas border. Schools were 
closed in Ohio as well as in Texas (Szabo, 2014), and both New York 
and New Jersey imposed a quarantine on travelers with possible Ebola 
contacts (Thompson, 2014). Of course, the possibility of sampling error 
cannot be ruled out.
Strengths and Limitations
This investigation has several noteworthy strengths, including a rela-
tively large sample gathered at a critical moment in the unfolding of a 
real-world event. In addition, the results are reasonably clear, offering 
support for some expectations and an unequivocal lack of support for 
others.
Of course, the study also possesses noteworthy limitations. It is hard 
to generalize the findings to other infectious diseases given that the 
data are limited to one disease in one Western country at one point in 
history. Second, strictly speaking, cross-sectional data preclude causal 
inference. However, the nature of the variables under study tempers this 
principle. For example, it seems implausible that fear of Ebola exerted a 
causal influence on individuals’ reporting of their gender, age, ethnic-
ity, or location. However cross-sectional data do not allow us to rule 
out the possibility that fear influenced reporting of interpersonal and 
media exposure measures. But, at least in the case of media exposure, 
there is evidence that self-reports are reasonably valid indicators of 
more objective measures of the same variable (Southwell, Barmada, 
Hornik, & Maklan, 2002). Additional research using longitudinal or 
experimental designs is needed to sort out questions of causal flow.
Third, the nonprobability sample was not representative of the na-
tion generally nor of Dallas specifically. Accordingly, point estimates in 
our data must be viewed with caution. Another substantial limitation 
to this investigation was the absence of measures of communication 
content. Having such information would have aided our interpretation 
of several findings, especially those concerned with interpersonal and 
media exposure. Future research would benefit from the inclusion of 
even gross indices of content. Work that links content analysis of media 
with individual-level data on interpersonal communication and fear 
would be especially valuable.
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Finally, our indices of communication were relatively crude. Inter-
personal communication was undefined for participants, which may 
have introduced error into the data to the extent that interpretations 
of the phrase varied across the sample. And the media measures were 
not sufficiently granular to capture exposure via social media chan-
nels like Instagram and Twitter (Sellnow-Richmond et al., 2018). Both 
weaknesses should be corrected in future research.
Conclusions
Using data gathered near the peak of a perceived disease crisis, this study 
yielded several important findings: (a) Widespread fear of infectious 
disease is possible, even when the objective level of risk is extremely 
low; (b) being young, female, and non-White are risk factors for high 
levels of fear; and (c) media and interpersonal amplification stations are 
likely complicit in magnifying fear but (d) can also serve to counteract 
it. Collectively, these observations contribute to our general understand-
ing of public reactions to infectious disease and point the way forward 
toward interventions designed to mitigate negative emotional reactions.
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Notes
1. Of course, not everyone agrees. For example, Gray and McNaughton 
(2000) contended that fear is an acute response to immediate danger that can 
be remedied, whereas anxiety is a response to a future threat that cannot be 
avoided. Lazarus (1991) differentiated them in terms of physical versus exis-
tential threat. However, even inventories designed to measure fear and anxiety 
as separate constructs find an average correlation of .46 (Sylvers, Lilienfeld, & 
LaPrairie, 2011). Though it may be useful to distinguish fear and anxiety for 
certain purposes, we see their difference mostly as a matter of degree.
2. The terminology is regrettable in that stations can amplify or attenu - 
ate perceptions of risk. Phrasing such as modulation stations would more ac-
curately convey what is meant. But, because the phrase amplification stations 
is now embedded into the research literature, we bow to previous usage.
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ABSTRACT
How do European Union (EU) member states communicate risks to their citizens? In this study, we 
defi ne risk communication as the information provided by diff erent levels of government to citizens 
regarding possible future crises to which the general public might be subjected. We seek to answer 
the following questions: Are there any patterns in the risk communication strategies among EU 
member states in terms of the sender of information, the message conveyed, the method used, 
and the intended audience? Finally, to what extent is the state involved in ensuring the safety of 
its citizens? To tackle these questions, we examine the risk communication strategy of eight coun-
tries: Sweden, Finland, Germany, England, France, Estonia, Greece, and Cyprus. Our data consist of 
governmental web sites, publications, campaigns, and other modes of communication, such as 
videos posted on YouTube, with questions centering on institutional actors, methods of delivery, 
content, and eff ectiveness. We fi nd that the institutional architecture of risk communication aligns 
with the broad administrative system of each member state. Countries tend to focus on risks that 
are specifi c to their context, with Sweden and, to a lesser extent, Germany having a special focus 
on consequences and providing guidelines to the public on how to survive for a certain period 
of time in the absence of the state. Especially in Sweden, though the state is a salient actor in risk 
communication through the dissemination of information at the agency level, the state retreats 
while urging the resilient citizen to take control of his or her own crisis management.
KEYWORDS: Risk communication; comparative studies; European politics; resilience; public 
policy
In May 2018, the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB) sent a 
pamphlet to all 4.7 million Swedish households containing information 
on how to deal with the consequences of contemporary emergencies, 
titled If Crisis or War Comes. This brochure was an updated version 
of a series of information sheets from World War II and the Cold War 
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era (Dwyer, 2018) and began with a message stating that even though 
Sweden was safer than many other countries, it faced threats that 
might jeopardize its security and independence (Myndigheten för 
samhällsskydd och beredskap, 2018).
Recent events with national repercussions for Sweden include the 
looming Russian geopolitical threat, the terrorist attack in central 
Stockholm in April 2017, the forest fires in Västmanland of 2014 (see 
Öhman, Giritli Nygren, & Olofsson, 2016), and the extensive forest 
fires in summer 2018. The cultural imagination of realized disasters 
and many other chimerical ones influences the response to current 
challenges. The “emergency imaginary” dictates the perception of di-
sasters among professionals (Gregersen & Winkel Holm, n.d.), and in 
turn, this perception determines what risks professionals communicate 
to the public and how they do so. More specifically, Calhoun (2008) 
theorized that framing events as emergencies shapes the way in which 
we understand aberrant (perhaps) events, such as inter alia crises, 
disasters, and international conflicts, and delineates the range of ac-
ceptable actions. The emergency imaginary is a way of conceptualizing 
problematic events, foregrounding their “unpredictability, abnormality, 
and brevity” while concomitantly pointing to their attendant corollary: 
intervention (Calhoun, 2008, p. 375). Calhoun treated the issue of inter-
national emergencies and humanitarian intervention, but theoretically, 
we can scale down and consider problematic events at the micro level 
and what intervention at the individual level might look like.
Calhoun (2008) also noted that attention must be paid to the ways 
risks and threats are conceptualized so that we may understand “the 
social organization of fear” (p. 381), on one hand, and, on the other, 
how the sense of vulnerability is distributed. This is not a new concept 
in risk communication research, and in this study, we consider risk 
communication specifically at the preparedness phase, which
is designed to understand and address the public’s awareness and 
knowledge gaps related to risk events, to elicit desired preparedness 
behaviors through identifying and utilizing effective communication 
channels, to ensure adequate understanding, and to educate about what 
actions to take when messages are issued. (Sheppard, Janoske, & Liu, 
2012, p. 11; see also Leiss, 1996; Lofstedt, 2010)
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The empirical impetus for this research was the striking catholic and 
centralized nature of the aforementioned communiqué issued by the 
Swedish state. Our study aims at filling the apparent lacuna of cross-
country European comparisons when it comes to risk communication 
at the preparedness phase (see, however, Infanti et al., 2013; Lofstedt, 
2010; Tourenq, Boustras, & Gutteling, 2017 for a set of guidelines). From 
a theoretical perspective, we seek to uncover the architecture (actors, 
institutions, and the degree of their involvement, message, method, 
and audience) as part of the risk communication process. In other 
words, our research question is as follows: How is this imaginary of 
emergencies in Europe reflected in the content of risk communication 
messages issued by governmental organizations?
To answer this question, we conducted a comparative study of eight 
European Union (EU) member states with the objective to map the 
institutional risk communication structure, the messages that these 
actors send, how these messages are conveyed, and to whom.
Literature Review
Risk communication as a research area is broad and diversified, includ-
ing areas such as risk perception, risk and emotions, social construc-
tion of risk, media communication, framing, social movements, public 
engagement, and, not least, crisis communication (Cho, Reimer, & Mc-
Comas, 2006; Ulmer, Sellnow, & Seeger, 2011). Therefore, whenever we 
study “risk communication,” we need to define our object of inquiry and 
thus delimit our investigation. In this article, we investigated national 
and subnational risk communication and more specifically the way 
different European countries have designed their risk communication 
architecture regarding possible future crises where the receiver is the 
public at large.
Empirically and theoretically focused research has targeted the 
receivers’ information seeking (Alaszewski, 2005), perception of risk 
communication tools and messages (Slovic, 1999), trust in commu-
nicators (Renn & Levine, 1991), vulnerabilities (Fothergill, Maestas, 
& Darlington, 1999), and sociocultural contexts (Wardman, 2014). 
Although such research has produced insight and guidelines regarding 
these different core aspects of risk communication, relatively few studies 
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have focused on public policy, particularly in a comparative perspective. 
Two exceptions are the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) report Trends in Risk Communication Policies and 
Practices from 2016, which reviewed the risk communication systems 
of 19 countries, and the 2017 study authored by Tourenq, Boustras, and 
Gutteling that compared the policy design of Cyprus, France, and the 
Netherlands (see also Infanti et al.’s 2013 literature review on effective 
risk communication in Europe). Reflecting the risk communication 
literature, the OECD (2016) defined six criteria for effective risk com-
munication:
• Consistency across different risk communication tools.
• Two-way communication and interactive approaches.
• Accuracy and trust. Best available knowledge should be used 
in a transparent way.
• Accessibility of information for citizens, NGOs (non-govern-
mental organizations) and private organizations to seek and use.
• Information adapted to the audience’s cognitive capacities, their 
exposure or vulnerability.
• Cross-sectoral and trans-boundary, reflecting the cross-border, 
multiple dimensions and possible cascading effects of threats 
and hazards. (p. 30)
The report illustrates how risk communication systems may be un-
derstood and evaluated based on these criteria and the state of the art 
(e.g., Hampel, 2006; Leiss, 1996; Renn & Levine, 1991; Ulmer et al., 
2011). See Table 1.
The conclusions of the report partly indicate that national risk com-
munication needs to be more inclusive and interactive and to focus more 
on prevention, that is, provide more information about what people can 
do to mitigate their exposure to risk. Tourenq, Boustras, and Gutteling 
(2017) argued similarly in a comparative study of Cyprus, France, and 
the Netherlands. They evaluated available information on the coun-
tries’ websites based on the assumption that two-way communication 
enhances individual preparedness and resilience. They found that both 
France and the Netherlands had interactive communication and that 
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the Netherlands particularly focused on the individual citizen’s ability 
not only to manage but also to prepare for crises. The risk communica-
tion of Cyprus, conversely, was exclusively one way, providing expert 
information for the purpose of “educating people” (Tourenq et al., 
2017, p. 547). Arguably, there exist two different assumptions on which 
risk communication architecture is based: the “educate the public” ap-
proach, where citizens are seen as passive and unknowledgeable, and 
the “resilient citizen” approach, where citizens are not only active and 
knowledgeable but also seeking responsibility for themselves and the 
community (see Aradau, 2014).
This leads us to the orientation of this article, which is a critical 
perspective of risk and risk communication as constituent components 
of the imaginary of emergencies (Boisseau, Feltey, Flynn, Gelfand, & 
Triece, 2008; Calhoun, 2008). Risk and its communication create a 
demand for changes to society and to individuals: Risk may be viewed 
as a concept intent on exercising power (Wilkinson, 2009). The notion 
of risk can thus serve as a control technique expressing the interaction 
TABLE 1 Core Elements of a National Risk Communication System
Element Description
Governance Who is in charge of risk communication, and what is the 
institutional structure of risk communication governance?
Considering all hazards and 
forward thinking
How comprehensive and forward oriented are national risk 
communication practices?
Purpose of communication 
and activation of target 
audience
What is the purpose of countries’ risk communication, 
and how is the target audience involved to effectively 
communicate risk?
Focus on prevention How prevention focused are national risk communication 
practices?
Tapping into innovation What is the role of innovative technologies in countries’ 
risk communication practices?
Evaluation What is the effect of risk communication, and how is it 
being measured?
Note. Based on OECD (2016).
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of power relationships (Hannah-Moffat & O’Malley, 2007). This opens 
up for questions of how notions of risk come to “delimit what it is 
possible to think and say at a particular time, what purpose does this 
serve, and to whose benefit?” (Wardman, 2008, p. 1633), or as Calhoun 
(2008, p. 381) put it, how the conceptualization of risk impacts on the 
social organization of fear. In some cases, inequalities are (re)produced 
by modes of governance, including the use of “risk” as a regulatory 
regime that is shaped by power imbalances (Giritli Nygren, Öhman, & 
Olofsson, 2017; Montelius & Giritli Nygren, 2014). Risk communication 
often aims at supporting vulnerable populations, but by making the 
power dimension of risk communication and its intersection with other 
lines of power visible, we allow for an analysis of risk communication 
practices that does not hide the reproduction of existing norms and 
social inequality.
For this reason, we pay special attention to the issue of representative-
ness. The audience of risk communication consists of diverse publics, 
necessitating a certain tailoring of the message to establish trust and 
collaboration (Janoske, Liu, & Sheppard, 2012). Janoske et al. reported 
on children, the elderly and disabled, and racial and ethnic minorities. 
We considered risk communication aimed at transient populations as 
well as people living in rural areas in our study in an effort to broaden 
the diversity of publics under consideration.
In summary, there is a paucity of cross-country comparative research 
examining such issues as risk communication policies, institutional ac-
tors, the intended recipient and message content, and even fewer with 
a critical component. The extant international comparisons, though 
they provide an important starting point for thinking about risk com-
munication in comparative terms, do not go far enough in addressing 
the imaginary of emergencies in Europe and nuances among coun-
tries under investigation. For example, Tourenq et al. (2017) men-
tioned factors such as “history, people, management, and lack of funds” 
(pp. 546–547) but do not go any further. This article adds to the limited 
knowledge of risk communication at the national and subnational 
levels (Infanti et al., 2013) but also expands the analysis with a systematic 
comparison among EU countries. Such comparison has a number of 
practical implications. Different countries often face not only similar 
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risks but also risks that stretch over national boundaries. The insight 
into how countries perceive and communicate risk and prepare for 
crises has the potential to facilitate coordination in the face of an 
extraordinary event. A recent example of a European civil protection 
mobilization took place in summer 2018 when the coordinated effort 
of eight countries assisted Sweden in battling destructive forest fires 
(European Commission, 2018).
Research Design, Method, and Data
This is a qualitative systematic comparison aiming at capturing as much 
variation as possible among EU member states. To fulfill the objective 
of maximum variation in the cases selected, the logic of comparison is a 
variation of the “most different systems” logic, which is a logic of sys-
tematic cross-country comparison first articulated by Przeworski and 
Teune (1970; see also Collier, 1993; Meckstroth, 1975). Rather than un-
covering causal relationships, the eight-country comparison contrasted 
contexts to establish a framework for understanding how risk communi-
cation processes play out in different ways in each context. This interpre-
tive dimension in social sciences is accommodated within small N com-
parative studies as elaborated in Skocpol and Somers (1980). The authors 
posited that asking the same or similar analytical questions in contrast-
ing contexts may highlight divergences, making them more transpar-
ent—though this is not a causal analysis producing sweeping theory.
To that end, the selection of cases covered the entire geographic 
gamut of the EU 28. Geography is relevant because it partly (though 
not exclusively) determines what kind of events might be conceived as 
threats by each country. Additionally, geography functions as a kind 
of proxy for the historical contingences idiosyncratic to each country. 
Traditionally, Greece and Cyprus belong to the European South; France 
and Germany are in Western Europe (though Germany is sometimes 
classified as Central) and Sweden and Finland belong to Northern 
Europe, while Estonia is part of Eastern Europe. The British Isles here 
are considered a part of Western Europe,1 though elsewhere they may 
be classified as a region of their own (Libraries of the University of 
Minnesota, 2012).
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Additionally, the countries under examination covered the entire 
typology range of public administration systems in Europe (Kuhlmann 
& Wollmann, 2014). This is relevant because risk communication is 
part of the public administration arrangements of each case in terms of 
institutions involved, message conveyed, and so on. France and Greece 
belong to the Continental European Napoleonic model, characterized 
by a strong centralized government and a powerful centralized bureau-
cracy, which means that the subnational and local levels are considered 
to be subordinate. In contrast, in the Continental European Federal 
model (Germany), the central bureaucracy is weaker, and the subna-
tional, decentralized institutions have more power. In the Scandinavian 
model (Sweden, Finland), the administrative structure is also highly 
TABLE 2 Thematic Guide for Data Analysis
Category Constituent questions
Institutional actors What institutional actors are involved in the risk 
communication process?
Are there any nongovernmental organizations involved, 
and if so, how?
Method How is the message communicated to the public?
Is the communication in any language other than the 
official language for each country investigated? If that is the 
case, is the message the same?
Are there any provisions to spread the message to 
subgroups of the population, such as (a) people with 
disabilities, (b) nonnative speakers (tourists or immigrants), 
(c) people in elderly care, (d) the homeless.
What kinds of media (videos, pictures, text) are used to 
convey the message?
Content What kinds of risks and potential crises do the countries 
under comparison take up?
Are there any campaigns (with or without a timeline) 
geared toward raising public awareness when it comes to 
crisis preparedness? If so, what do these campaigns look 
like?
Effectiveness Have there been any evaluations assessing the effectiveness 
of the risk communication tools? 
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decentralized, while the most salient feature of the Anglo-Saxon model 
(England and, to a certain extent, Cyprus) is new public management 
decentralized managerial practices (Kuhlmann & Wollmann, 2014). In 
Estonia, we capture the postcommunist environment with the attendant 
interventionist state.
Our investigation was conducted on publicly available text and im-
ages (still and video) comprising risk communication material at the 
preparedness phase. Data included information about risks, warnings, 
self-protection guidelines, and other publications geared toward various 
publics on outlets (official websites, YouTube channels, and Facebook 
groups) authored and curated by public entities of, or related to, civil 
protection or civil defense. We, the authors, have native or near-native 
linguistic competence as well as country-specific knowledge of the 
countries we compared. This eliminated any linguistic or cultural mis-
understandings and allowed for a nuanced analysis of texts and images. 
We asked the same questions of the data, thematically arranged and 
summarized in Table 2. We used these questions to address the core 
elements of a national risk communication system (see Table 1) and, 
in turn, unpack the imaginary of emergencies.
Results
In this section, we present the results of the data analysis based on 
the thematic guide presented in Table 2. The purpose of the analysis 
is to understand how the imaginary of emergencies (Calhoun, 2008) 
is reflected in the risk communication practices of the eight selected 
countries by fleshing out any convergent as well as divergent points 
among them, structured after the items in Table 1.
Governance Arrangements: Who Is in Charge of Risk 
Communication?
The degree of the centralization of responsibility for risk communica-
tion varies among the countries under comparison, generally along the 
lines of their administrative system. The institutional risk communica-
tion architecture in the Scandinavian countries follows the corporatist 
model with civil society and the local level being important actors and 
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builds on collaboration among agencies and municipalities as well as 
the involvement of private and volunteer sectors. The Swedish Civil 
Contingencies Agency (MSB), placed under the Ministry of Justice, and 
the Finnish department for Rescue Services have strategic, coordinat-
ing, and supportive responsibilities. More specifically, the Swedish MSB 
provides information to the public mainly through two websites (http://
www.dinsakerket.se/ and http://www.krisinformation.se/), though the 
websites of county administrative boards and municipalities also convey 
information to the public. The Finnish Rescue Services are responsible 
for preventing accidents, providing emergency services, and protecting 
the population in exceptional circumstances at the regional level and are 
also responsible for civil defense (Finnish Ministry of the Interior, 2018).
Conversely, France and Greece, in Western and Southern Europe, 
respectively, follow the continental Napoleonic model, and unsurpris-
ingly, the national government is in charge of what is communicated 
and how. In France, the General Secretariat for Defense and National 
Security (SGDSN) in the Ministry of the Interior coordinates the na-
tional plans that serve as decision support tools at the national level. 
The secretariat supports the prime minister and the president in their 
role as crisis managers and is also responsible for civil defense (Gou-
vernement Français, 2018a). Similarly, in Greece, civil protection issues 
are handled by the General Secretariat for Civil Protection established 
in 1995 and tasked with coordinating risk communication to citizens 
both in general terms and during exceptional circumstances (Republic 
of Greece, 2002).
The Estonian Rescue Board, the third largest public service institu-
tion in Estonia, is the main actor in risk communication (Päästeamet, 
2017), whereas in England, the substance and method of delivery of 
risk communication are the responsibility of Local Resilience Forums. 
These are not legal entities but “collaborative mechanisms” that “have a 
collective responsibility to plan, prepare and communicate in a multi-
agency environment” (Cabinet Office, 2013, p. 3). Most of these follow 
police force boundaries (Garton Grimwood, 2017). The organization 
with leading responsibilities in emergency management is the Civil 
Contingencies Secretariat in the Cabinet Office, established in 2001 
(Cabinet Office, 2013).
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In Germany, the institution responsible for informing the public 
of risks and potential crises is the German Federal Office of Civil Pro-
tection and Disaster Assistance (Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz 
und Katastrophenhilfe; BBK) under the German Interior Ministry 
(BMI), which is the highest federal authority. The main purpose of 
the BBK is to prepare the public for times of crisis; coordinate all the 
bodies involved before, during, and after a crisis; and provide the 
physical and psychological support necessary for citizens’ well-being 
(Bundesamt für Bevölkerungsschutz und Katastrophenhilfe [BBK], 
2018a, 2018b). Municipalities are active in civil defense (Zivilschutz- und 
Katastrophenhilfegesetz, 1997/2009, para. 5/1), and they use informa-
tion available on the BBK website. Additionally, a host of voluntary 
organizations is actively involved in communicating information to 
the public.
This is not the case in Cyprus, where for one to be a volunteer, one 
must be a citizen of the Republic of Cyprus and register by submitting 
an online form. Strategic policy decisions are made by the General Civil 
Defense Administration, while there are also five district administra-
tions (Cyprus Ministry of the Interior, 2018a). The Civil Defense Force 
has the added responsibility to protect citizens in periods of hostilities 
(Cyprus Ministry of the Interior, 2018b).
Which Hazards Are Communicated, and to What Extent Is 
the Focus on Prevention?
Greece, Estonia, Cyprus, and France focus on various known risks 
and hazards—such as earthquakes; inclement weather; landslides; and 
chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats—with 
a focus on those threats specific to each country. For example, Greece 
places a particular emphasis on forest fires, which occur annually and 
to a certain extent are due to either human error or arson, but there is 
no mention of the threat of terrorist attack or hostilities. The current 
geopolitical alignment of Greece and its self-reference as an interstice 
between East and West may exclude the imaginary of a space for terror-
ist attacks of the kind similar to those elsewhere in Europe. However, 
emphasis is put on home fires as, due to the economic crisis, people 
have started using braziers and burning various materials in their 
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fireplaces. There is a marked focus on prevention of these well-defined 
risks (General Secretariat for Civil Protection, 2018).
In Estonia in 2016, a spatial analysis of home fires showed a correla-
tion with socioeconomic factors. In Tallinn, for example, home fires 
occur more often in residential buildings from the Soviet era, where 
inhabitants in general are older, have lower income, and live alone 
and where Estonian is not their first language. In a departure from the 
other countries under comparison in this study, the Estonian Rescue 
Board conducts home visits during which they advise residents on 
how to make their home safer. In 2016, the board carried out more 
than 17,000 home consultations, covering 2.7% of Estonian house-
holds. It also organizes safety awareness days and regular school visits 
(Päästeamet, 2017).
France covers a broader array of risks with a number of sectoral 
plans (national and territorial), each corresponding to a previously 
identified risk or threat. A set of complementary plans, Plan Vigipirate 
(the Pirate Family), specifically addresses the capacity of the state and 
relevant stakeholders to deal with terrorist attacks (Gouvernement Fran-
çais, 2018b). At the national website, there is a specific section on risk 
prevention (Gourvernment Français, 2018c). Under the slogan “Better 
prepared, better informed, you will be able to act in case of problems 
and help your loved ones in the face of an emergency,” video tutorials 
address a number of risks. The Ministry of Interior Affairs’s website 
contains a section about personal security (“Ma sécurité”) where citizens 
can learn how to avoid accidents inside and outside the home with a 
special section for the elderly (French Ministry of the Interior, 2018).
The Civil Defense Force in Cyprus takes up the same risks as Greece 
with additional information on what to do in the event of hostile ac-
tion (the Greek word ehthropraxía [εχθροπραξία] conveys “act of war” 
rather than “terrorist attack”), including the case of a bombing cam-
paign by another nation and fires caused by such action. The message 
is unequivocal: “Self-protection is basically the responsibility of all of 
us. Take the necessary measures in good time” (Civil Defense Force, 
2002, n.p.).
While this quote stems from the threat of invasion in Cyprus, the 
Greater Manchester Local Resilience Forum has a similar message on 
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its website: “Whilst we can’t prevent emergencies happening, we can 
plan ahead to minimise the impact” (Greater Manchester Prepared, 
2018, n.p.), admitting that the state is unable to keep the citizenry safe 
through prevention measures and that safety is the responsibility of 
the individual. In addition to England, risk communication strategies 
in Sweden and Germany are characterized by an all-hazards approach 
that focuses on consequences and the open admission that risks can-
not be prevented.
Both Sweden and Germany have incorporated preparedness cam-
paigns in their risk communication strategies, in which the public is 
urged to have a store of supplies at hand to survive a certain period of 
time during which a complete disruption of societal functions is imag-
ined, including loss of electricity, water, means of transportation, and 
any other amenity that one takes for granted in an advanced Western 
democracy. The German BKK’s website recommends storing enough 
food and water to survive for at least 2 weeks in the worst-case scenario 
(BBK, 2017, p.10), though conflicting guidelines from the Ministry of 
the Interior advising 5 days’ worth of water supplies and 10 days’ worth 
of food created confusion among the citizens (Bundesministerium des 
Innern, für Bau und Heimat, 2016).
In Sweden, to raise public awareness, MSB ran a weeklong cam-
paign on May 8, 2017, titled “Upside Down” (Upp och Ner). This was 
the second such MSB-led campaign, and its target group was women 
between 45 and 64 years of age. The campaign centered on disruption 
in electricity supply and focused on the necessities each household 
ought to have to be able to function during a days-long blackout. This 
campaign essentially reinforced the earlier message communicated 
on the websites of Swedish municipalities and county administrative 
boards: “this is what you need to have at home during a crisis” (detta 
behöver du ha hemma vid en kris).
In Finland, a very different 72-hour campaign mainly consisted of 
meetings between nongovernmental organization (NGO) representa-
tives and the public. The campaign was partly carried out online, but 
the main focus was on face-to-face workshops. Apart from the official 
72-hour website (http://www.72tuntia.fi/), which is available in Finn-
ish, Swedish, and English, several organizations, for example, Suomen 
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Pelastusalan Keskusjärjestö (the Finnish National Rescue Associa-
tion; SPEK), also distributed printed information about the 72-hour 
campaign. Notably, SPEK, which is a national consultancy and service 
organization for fire and rescue services responsible for training NGO 
workers, has used MSB YouTube videos in their training material in 
the Swedish speaking areas of Finland. Whereas the 72-hour campaign 
is mainly geared toward the urban population, SPEK also maintains 
a project called “Our Safe Village” that is geared toward small-town 
preparedness for everyday disruptions and accidents (Suomen Pelas-
tusalan Keskusjärjestö, 2018).
Tap Into Innovation: The Use of Technology in Risk 
Communication
With the exception of Cyprus, all countries use YouTube to post TV 
spots and educational films. They also use Facebook and Twitter as 
information dissemination tools. Sweden, England, France, and Ger-
many have launched smartphone applications varying in scope and 
interactivity. For example, the French government describes the aims 
of the app (called SAIP) as follows: “It is part of an approach to de-
velop a culture of vigilance and security of our citizens, initiated with 
the awareness campaign ‘React in case of terrorist attack’ which gives 
practical instructions based on: ‘escape, hide, alert’”(Gouvernement 
Français, 2018d, n.p.).
Conversely, the German app NINA aims at informing the public 
about current weather situations; national, regional, and local threats; 
and, in particular, large-scale emergencies (Großschadenslagen). The 
dissemination of local-specific information is limited due to the service 
availability (BBK, 2018c).
Know Your Impact
It is unclear whether the countries under comparison know the impact 
of their risk communication strategies. Though the institutional ac-
tors involved have the mandate to evaluate (e.g., Republic of Greece, 
2002), no evaluations of risk communication strategies are available on 
governmental websites. Estonia, however, is an exception to this: The 
Estonian Rescue Board seeks public feedback to measure satisfaction 
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and trust in the board’s operations. Feedback was gathered after rescue 
events, home consultations, training sessions, safety days, and construc-
tion site inspections (Päästeamet, 2017).
Communicate—to Whom?
Most countries convey some information in English, though the English 
version lacks in depth and detail. The “easy language” versions of the 
Swedish and German websites are also limited. Where the automated 
translation function of Google is used, the results can range from con-
fusing to amusing. At the two sides of the continuum are Greece, with 
information in six professionally translated languages, and Cyprus and 
England, with information only in Greek and English, respectively.
The image of society that comes across by the risk communication 
content and techniques is fairly traditional in terms of family structures, 
households, and people. For example, images of people with obvious 
disabilities are few and far between.
Generally speaking, spatial images are generic, though the environ-
ment is implicitly urban. This is deduced not by what is said but rather 
by what is left unsaid. For example, there is no information specific to 
the countryside. Exceptions to these are the “Safe Village” campaign 
in Finland and the information from the English Local Resilience 
Forums, because the latter are very localized and the information fits 
the local context.
Communicate—for What Purpose, and What Is the Role of 
the Recipient?
All eight EU countries, to various degrees, advise the public on how to 
prepare, act, and protect themselves and others during events ranging 
from inclement weather to acts of war by providing specific information 
on these risks. We did not find any instances of explicitly interactive 
communication. Even in countries in which there exist smartphone 
apps, the information seems to be flowing one way. Having said this, 
the content of information seems to activate the recipients: They are 
urged to have a family contingency plan, to actively protect their homes 
from fires, and to be vigilant and inform if they see suspicious objects 
left unattended in public spaces.
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As mentioned elsewhere in this article, Sweden and, to a certain 
extent, Germany have incorporated a specific kind of campaign in their 
risk communication strategies, a campaign focused on consequences 
rather than risks that urges the public to have supplies to last them 
for some time in case of complete societal breakdown due to a mostly 
unspecified—and largely irrelevant to the substance of the communi-
cation—risk. Sweden alone is sending this information in print form 
to all the households in the country.
This focus on the consequences of an unspecified catastrophic event 
has had the unforeseen effect of commodifying risk in Sweden. The 
emphasis on materiality has created a marketplace for the products 
that the state recommends be in every household storage space, such 
as canned water.
We argue that this is a case of the citizen being nudged into a per-
ceived resilient state by the admission of the public sector that it will be 
unavailable at the onset of an unspecified extreme event. Additionally, 
this is a rather static idea of resilience, as the focus is on the materiality 
of preparedness rather than social relations and making sure that one’s 
neighbor is safe as well. This discourse echoes the U.S. Federal Emer-
gency Management Agency (FEMA), which shifts the responsibility of 
emergency management from the federal to the state, local, community, 
and individual levels (Federal Emergency Management Agency, 2018).
Conclusions and Suggestions for Further Research
The eight countries under comparison cover the gamut of geographies 
and administrative systems. Moreover, two pairs of countries—Greece 
and Cyprus and, to a certain extent, Finland and Sweden—share a 
common language and the culture and heritage that are embedded in 
language. One would expect similarities in the way the imaginary of 
emergencies is reflected in the risk communication policies of Greece 
and Cyprus, both part of the European South but with different admin-
istrative systems, but that is not the case. Finland runs a campaign with 
the same title as Sweden’s, shares the same message, and uses material 
from MSB in their information tool kit in the Swedish-speaking parts 
of the country. However, the focus is on training volunteer personnel 
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and not blanket information dissemination to the public. There are 
also two countries that share a (post)colonial relationship—the United 
Kingdom and Cyprus. While the United Kingdom and Cyprus share 
the same administrative system to some extent, a vestige from an earlier 
colonial relationship, Cyprus is alone in the degree of militarization 
of civil defense, and the United Kingdom is the foremost country ar-
ranging its risk communication structure under the term resilience. 
The factor overriding a common heritage (with Greece) or a common 
administrative system (with the United Kingdom) is previous experi-
ence with an extraordinary event, and Cyprus has had a very recent 
experience of military action.
The pattern of institutional structures that organizes risk com-
munication in all the countries under investigation aligns with their 
administrative systems. The institution that deals with risk commu-
nication is a variation of a civil protection entity normally under the 
ministry of the interior, though in the United Kingdom, the central 
institution is in the Cabinet Office. Incidentally, this is the equivalent 
of the Swedish Prime Minister’s Office, where the Secretariat for Crisis 
Management was placed when it was first created in Sweden in 2007 
(Petridou & Sparf, 2017). Sweden and the United Kingdom use the 
term civil contingencies, whereas Finland, Cyprus, and Estonia use the 
term civil defense. The remaining countries use civil protection. There 
is a marked military component in the Cypriot structure, but perhaps 
this is unsurprising given that its capital is the only remaining divided 
capital in the world. There are military echoes in Finland and Estonia 
as well, which is again perhaps unsurprising given their historical 
contingencies and recent geopolitical events.
The pattern of central control with decentralized input holds more or 
less in all countries, including the federal Germany. The U.K. system is 
very different, however, where the central level has only strategic func-
tions and all the risk communication competencies have been devolved 
to the regional level in what are called Local Resilience Forums. This 
makes for a lack of uniformity in information that is communicated to 
the public, as each resilience forum is region specific. At the same time, 
the public receives information relevant to them and not a generic ver-
sion of risk communication. In the other countries under comparison, 
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information is reproduced at the subnational level from the national 
website, which can make for a “one-size-fits-all” information packet 
missing local nuances, such as center–periphery issues. In France, 
there is a marked fragmentation of information disseminated to the 
public with several ministries being involved in the process. Notably, 
this fragmentation is at the national level, as the responsibility for 
risk communication rests with the national government. Conversely, 
in Greece, for example, the Civil Contingencies Secretariat informs 
citizens of risks, including risks that are corollaries of adverse weather, 
whereas in France, the Ministry of Ecological and Solidarity Transition 
informs on these risks.
Volunteer organizations are present in all the countries in question, 
though not to the same degree. This ranges from a controlled registra-
tion system in Cyprus to very active involvement in Finland to a separate 
volunteer organization coordination entity in the United Kingdom. 
Other than Germany and Finland, in which volunteer organizations 
provide risk communication, in most of the countries in question, 
the communication is handled by government at various levels. For 
example, in Germany, crisis management rests heavily on the engage-
ment of volunteers in local organizations such as fire brigades and 
rescue services. These local organizations communicate information 
about risks related to their area of responsibility (e.g., fire) and how to 
become a member and participate in crisis management.
Websites are the foremost vehicle for communicating information to 
the public, though in Sweden, France, England, and Germany (notably, 
in the more economically developed Northern and Western Europe), the 
national government also employs apps as early warning systems. The 
authorities also use social media to disseminate information: Facebook, 
Twitter, and YouTube, though the extent varies among the countries 
under comparison. In Estonia, the public sector conducts home visits 
to disseminate self-protection guidelines, a possible vestige of an era 
of an omnipresent state. The range of state involvement in the amount 
and scope of information communicated is quite broad, ranging from 
the aforementioned home visits to rather sparse information from the 
Civil Defense Force in Cyprus, where the only videos found on YouTube 
were recordings of military parades.
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Notably, the strategic risk communication policy gaze of the United 
Kingdom and Sweden seems to be fixed westward toward the United 
States in terms of devolution and a responsibilitization of the individual, 
respectively. Especially in Sweden, though the state is a salient actor in 
risk communication through the dissemination of information at the 
agency level, the state retreats while nudging at the resilient citizen, 
urging him or her to take control of his or her own crisis management.
Finally, the comparison revealed that though there are similarities 
in the way the imaginary of emergencies (Calhoun, 2008) is reflected 
in risk communication policies in EU countries, there are also major 
differences. With the exception of governance arrangements, which 
follow each country’s administrative system, we did not find stable 
patterns connecting political administrative systems and geography to 
the risk communication policy of all the countries under consideration. 
The study, however, allowed us to tease out and showcase factors of 
risk communication policy by comparing and contrasting across eight 
European contexts.
Having said this, we argue that more knowledge is needed regarding 
the effects of campaigns and risk communication activities directed 
toward the various publics, both in terms of these publics’ understand-
ing, knowledge, and preparedness and in terms of possible differences 
between their diverse resources to respond. Furthermore, there is a 
need for better understanding of the motives behind the various ap-
proaches that different countries apply. Our European comparison shed 
some light on the national-level processes, but more cross-country 
comparisons within Europe and beyond are needed to position our 
results in a global context. In addition to breadth, we also advocate 
depth. There is a need for comparative field research and interviews 
with the institutional actors and publics involved in the communication 
process to understand the construction of the imaginary of emergen-
cies in different national contexts. Finally, it would be beneficial for 
researchers and policy makers alike to understand the diffusion of risk 
communication policies and the national environments that ideation-
ally influence the policy process.
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1. For practical reasons, and due to the devolved nature of the United 
Kingdom, we focused on English Local Resilience forums and did not look 
at any data in Scotland, Wales, or Northern Ireland. Additionally, all the 
material for Cyprus refers to actors and processes in the Republic of Cyprus. 
No information was collected regarding practices in the so-called Turkish 
Republic of Northern Cyprus, an entity recognized solely by Turkey.
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ABSTRACT
This study examines stigma from the perspective of residents of Fukushima prefecture following 
the 2011 nuclear disaster in Fukushima, Japan, to better understand eff ective crisis communica-
tion strategies that can mitigate the negative eff ects of self-stigma and promote sustainable 
psychosocial recovery. Social cognitive theory was employed to explore cognitive, aff ective, and 
behavioral changes faced by Fukushima residents in response to the stigma imposed upon them 
after the disaster. The study result based on in-depth interviews with residents of Shinchimachi, 
Fukushima, indicates that aff ectively, participants experienced a remarkable amount of fear and 
sadness. Cognitively, they focused on concerns about outsiders’ negative images or misinforma-
tion about Fukushima, changed priorities or values, and self-effi  cacy. Behaviorally, they actively 
resisted the stigma while strengthening their connections and belonging to their own community. 
Additionally, residents felt that they were branded as polluted and contagious and attributed the 
creation of a Fukushima stigma to a lack of full and accurate information as well as mistrust in main 
information sources, including media and government. This research suggests that developing a 
more transparent and locally based communication and information system could mitigate the 
negative eff ects of self-stigma. Theoretical implications for future research and policy suggestions 
for crisis communications are discussed.
KEYWORDS: Great East Japan Earthquake; Fukushima; social cognitive theory; stigma; risk; 
crisis; communication; media
This research explores perceived stigma of residents in a village in 
Fukushima, Japan, 5 years aft er the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake, 
tsunami, and nuclear disaster. The tsunami left  15,890 confi rmed deaths 
and a reported 5,000 to 8,000 people missing (Dunbar, McCullough, 
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Mungov, Varner, & Stroker, 2011; Johnson, 2011; Figure 1).1 The physical 
catastrophe—earthquake, tsunami, and radioactive nuclides being re-
leased from the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant—overwhelmed 
Northeast Japan (Blandford & Ahn, 2012; Maeda & Oe, 2015). Radiation 
prolonged public health concerns and damaged Fukushima’s fishing 
and agriculture economy (Maeda & Oe, 2015). The ongoing disaster 
extended beyond the physical needs of immediate cleanup, planned 
reconstruction, and public health prevention processes. Communica-
tion breakdowns between the government, the power plant, and mass 
media caused panic (Maeda & Oe, 2015), while rumors and framed 
media stories changed the social environment both within and outside 
of Japan (Ben-Ezra et al., 2015). Bromet (2011) suggested that examining 
both mental and physical destruction following the nuclear disaster will 
allow insight into long-term recovery for future disasters.
Fukushima was viewed as radiated, and the land and people within 
faced stigma (Ben-Ezra et al., 2015). According to a 2012 survey con-
ducted in temporary housing units for tsunami and radiation refugees, 
FIGURE 1 A candle inside of bamboo reads 元気でがんばってます安らかに 
(I am fine and living my life to the fullest. So rest in peace) at an annual memorial 
in Shinchimachi for victims of the March 2011 disaster (Kwesell, 2013).
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people felt branded as polluted (汚染された) from a prefecture of radiation 
(放射能の県; Kwesell, 2013, 2018). While some studies have examined 
types of stigmas imposed on residents of Fukushima (Maeda & Oe, 
2015; Shigemura, Tanigawa, Saito, & Nomura, 2012), few have focused 
on how the residents perceived the stigmas imposed on them. Exam-
ining perceived stigma and self-stigma of people affected by Japan’s 
disaster provides an opportunity to better understand the impacts of 
mass media and interpersonal communication in crisis communica-
tion. Reducing miscommunication, confusion, and a media-produced 
public stigma might lower self-stigma and the long-term negative psy-
chosocial effects that follow (Maeda & Oe, 2017). Crisis management 
relies on dissemination of accurate information. In Japan’s case, the 
government and mass media’s failure to inform led to confusion and 
mistrust, a situation that outlasted the initial disaster (Friedman, 2011).
This research explores perceptions, feelings, thoughts, and behav-
iors about stigma by Fukushima residents living in proximity to the 
power plant, including self-derogation, ideas about contamination and 
FIGURE 2 A mother stands in front of her “temporary home” holding her young-
est child. The family was displaced from nuclear radiation, and they lived in 
Shinchimachi’s temporary housing for 4 years (Kwesell, 2012).
236 kwesell and jung
contagion, efficacy, stigma resistance, and the origins of the Fukushima 
stigma, to better understand psychosocial responses and suggest future 
crisis communication strategies.
The study site is Shinchimachi, a coastal fishing and agriculture 
village located in the northeastern corner of Fukushima, 50 km north 
of the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant. One hundred nine resi-
dents out of its 8,030 population died in the tsunami, and many people 
lost their homes (Shinchi Town, n.d.-a). Some residents left the village 
after the nuclear explosions, and radiation refugees were relocated 
there. Figure 2 documents a family who lived in temporary housing 
in Shinchimachi. While recovery is under way, people still suffer from 
the fear of the unknown risk of living in Shinchimachi and from the 
stigma attached to being residents of Fukushima.
Literature Review
Conceptualizing Stigma
Stigma is born when one or more groups label another group with 
an imagined or invented negative attribute, and as it becomes more 
well known, it merges into a commonly understood stereotype (Puhl, 
Schwartz, & Brownell, 2005). Communication naturally spreads the 
stereotype, and the collective consciousness of one group diverges into 
two: the group or groups who assign the attribute (the stigmatizing) 
become self-defined as normal, and the group to whom the attribute is 
assigned (the stigmatized) becomes defined as abnormal (Durkheim, 
1933). To Link and Phelan (2001), the creation of a stigma is reliant 
on a co-occurrence of several components (e.g., labeling, stereotyp-
ing, separation, status loss, and discrimination) yet only exists when 
structural power is exercised through government, higher social classes, 
and media, among others. Mass media’s framed stories amplify events 
and perpetuate ideologies (Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), and the me-
dia acts as a “power holder” controlling limited information sources 
(Ball-Rokeach & De Fleur, 1975; Slovic et al., 1991). The perceptions 
that are spread become inherent defining characteristics of the group, 
and what was imagined and created become what is perceived as real 
(Link & Phelan, 2001).
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Though stigma is socially created, over time, even the self-under-
standing of those who are stigmatized begins to shift. According to 
Corrigan and Watson (2002), self-stigmatization occurs when people 
begin to feel the same way as they are described by the stigma, such 
that “they accept the discredited status as valid” (Steward et al., 2008, 
p. 3). Self-stigmatization can result in anger, loss of self-esteem, and 
even a weakening of community resilience (Corrigan, Watson, & Barr, 
2006). For example, HIV stigma left people with concerns about dis-
closure, a negative self-image, worries about the public’s attitude, lower 
self-esteem, and depression (Berger, Ferrans, & Lashley, 2001; Riggs, 
Vosvick, & Stallings, 2007).
Bromet (2011) suggested that in Japan, the limited yet ominous 
historical references to nuclear disaster are inaccurate, confusing, and 
contradictory, and they connect Fukushima to Hiroshima and Naga-
saki. This historical reference inflates already existing fears of nuclear 
disaster and radioactive nuclide exposure. Historically, atomic bomb 
survivors in Japan were dehumanized as “other” and contagious (Lifton, 
1987), and they continue to face shame, guilt, and alienation (Ishikawa, 
1981). Bromet (2011) suggested that the connection to the past is intrac-
table and that mental health effects in Fukushima will thus be lasting. 
Social Cognitive Theory: Affective, Cognitive, and 
Behavioral Dimensions
Bandura’s (1986) social cognitive theory (SCT) suggests that humans act 
based on their ability to decode what they have vicariously learned. The 
essence of humanness and society is based on the idea that “cognitive, 
affective and biological events, behavioral patterns, and environmen-
tal events all operate as interacting determinants that influence each 
other” (Bandura, 2001b, p. 266). Affective dimensions of stigma have 
been measured in attributes of fear/anxiety, embarrassment, shame or 
guilt, sadness/depression, shock, irritation or anger, personalization 
and internalization, and feelings of community belonging (Berger, 
1995; Bresnahan & Zhuang, 2016). Cognitive dimensions have been 
measured in rejection concerns, disclosure concerns, changed priori-
ties or values such as mentally coping, concerns about outsiders’ nega-
tive perceptions, internal stigma thoughts and overwhelming ideas, 
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indifference, self- and collective efficacy, and empowerment (Berger, 
1995; Berger et al., 2001; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Ritsher, Otilingam, & 
Grajales, 2003). Behavioral dimensions have been measured in social 
withdrawal, concealing, resisting stigma, seeking or not seeking help, 
avoiding travel, participating in or experiencing community connec-
tions or civic participation, and either witnessing stigma firsthand or 
hearing about it secondhand from a local person who had witnessed 
it (Fitzpatrick, 2008; Ritsher et al., 2003).
Vicarious learning: Sources of stigma formation in nuclear cri-
sis. One proposition of SCT is that individuals’ identity formation is 
based on vicarious learning. Individuals learn from interacting, by 
being part of social groups, and from mass media (Bandura, 1986). In 
cases of nuclear disaster, vicarious learning becomes more prominent 
due to the invisible potential danger of radiation as well as a lack of 
information (Cleary & Houts, 1984). Self-stigmatization via vicarious 
learning can be formed interpersonally (personal contacts, word of 
mouth, gossip; Kaiser, 2006), structurally (community norms and 
institutional policies; Hatzenbuehler, 2014), and through mass media 
(Slovic et al., 1991).
Gossip can spread conflicting narratives and cause panic (Stadler, 
2003), even leading to unsuccessful public health initiatives (Pop, 2016). 
Socol (2015) suggested that though the Chernobyl nuclear disaster 
resulted in a low number of radioactive-specific physical ailments, 
evacuees faced heightened anxiety and increased suicide from “myths 
about the threat of radiation” (p. 8). Rumors spread fears about birth 
defects, deaths, and cancers even in neighboring countries (Entman, 
1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989), and anxiety remained 6–20 years 
after the disaster (Bromet & Havenaar, 2007). In a study about the 
2003 SARS outbreak, Person and colleagues (2004) found that Internet 
rumors spread inaccurate information and led to fear and apprehen-
siveness about admitting to illness or seeking treatment. Shigemura 
and colleagues (2015) suggested that the negative effects of rumors in 
Fukushima could be mitigated by congruent public health information.
Structural stigma includes discriminatory social policies and com-
munity-level attitudes (Hatzenbuehler, 2014), segregated locations 
for care (Link & Phelan, 2006), and a lack of available social services 
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(Liegghio, 2017). Hatzenbuehler (2014) found that discriminating social 
policies influence community attitudes and escalate mental health is-
sues, leading to higher rates of mortality and cardiovascular disease. 
Schizophrenia treatment centers were found placed in impoverished 
and unsafe areas (Link & Phelan, 2006). Caregivers for youth with 
mental illness voiced struggles with social services’ fragmentation, 
including education systems, child protective services, and criminal 
justice (Liegghio, 2017).
Mass media’s powerful role is a central pillar to the creation of stigma 
(Bandura, 2001a). In the 1980 Mt. St. Helens disaster, mass media was 
the first-sought information source to resolve ambiguity during crisis 
(Hirschburg, Dillman, & Ball-Rokeach, 1986). Media’s framing deter-
mines the way in which the public views a crisis and can alter the sense 
of self that survivors experience (Coombs, 2007). Perko (2011) suggested 
that the media in Fukushima should have addressed the specific haz-
ard, immediate emergency instructions, and postdisaster instructions 
to mitigate negative outcomes, yet stories were embellished because 
reporters and editors had to fill budget lines and expand readership.
Research Questions
Based on SCT and prior literature, this study proposes the following 
two research questions:
RQ1: How are affective, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions pro-
posed by social cognitive theory reflected in Shinchimachi residents’ 
perceptions of stigma?
RQ2: What interpersonal, media, and governmental sources are likely 
to have influenced Shinchimachi residents’ perceptions of stigma?
Research Method
Research Procedure and Participants
This research is based on 12 in-depth interviews with residents of 
Shinchimachi. Participants were found through snowball sampling. 
All were directly affected by the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear 
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fallout. Eight were tsunami refugees who lived in temporary hous-
ing for 4 years, and one was a radiation refugee evacuated from her 
home to Shinchimachi. Their ages ranged from 24 to 80 years, with 
an average age of 59 years, which reflects the aging society of Shinchi-
machi, where the average age of residents is 48 years old (Shinchi 
Town, n.d.-b).
Interview questions were created in English and then translated into 
Japanese by a bilingual native Japanese speaker and linguistics profes-
sor. Particular attention was paid to avoiding directly asking sensitive 
or painful questions about experiences during and after the disaster. 
Interviews were conducted in Japanese, transcribed, and then translated 
into English by a team of five bilingual native Japanese translators and 
rechecked by the two most experienced translators. Each interview 
lasted between 50 and 120 minutes.
Around the eighth interview, answers started to become redundant. 
Instead of claiming saturation, the interviewers employed grounded 
theory research suggestions by Charmaz (2006) and Corbin and Strauss 
(2008), who recommended that after saturation is found, interviews go 
more in depth to unearth nuances that bring about new data. Thus the 
researchers began to ask more detailed questions, furthered clarifica-
tions, and allowed more time for new data to emerge in finer points.
Interview Questions and Data Analysis
Interview themes and questions were derived from the literature review. 
Examples of questions include the following:
• How do you think Fukushima people’s lives changed after 3.11 
(March 11, 2011)?
• Did you feel differently after 3.11 because you are from Fuku-
shima? If yes, how?
• How do you think Fukushima was represented in the news 
right after 3.11?
Data analysis was based on both theoretical and grounded approaches. 
An overall framework of affective, cognitive, and behavioral dimensions 
based on SCT (Bandura, 1986) was set a priori. However, establishing 
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an a priori coding scheme was not feasible because of the insufficient 
number of past studies concerning perceived stigma and communica-
tion in crisis settings, especially following a nuclear disaster. A two-stage 
coding process based on a grounded approach was thus employed. 
First, the authors engaged in a thematic analysis of the data, deriving 
subthemes within each of the affective, cognitive, and behavioral dimen-
sions. To ensure the validity of the subthemes, two graduate students 
were hired to revisit the data by coding available themes derived by the 
authors. The coders and the authors had several meetings to resolve 
disagreements, and the subthemes were updated with a clearer opera-
tionalization of concepts.
Results
Affective, Cognitive, and Behavioral Dimensions of 
Perceived Stigma (RQ1)
With regard to the categorization of participants’ perceptions of stigma, 
certain prominent themes arose. Affectively, participants discussed ex-
periencing a remarkable amount of fear and sadness. Cognitively, they 
focused on concerns about outsiders’ negative images or misinforma-
tion about Fukushima, changed priorities or values, and self-efficacy. 
Behaviorally, participants expressed actively resisting stigma, having 
increased community connections, and experiencing or hearing about 
enacted stigma.
Affective. The affective dimensions derived from prior theory were 
all mentioned, except for embarrassment and shock. The most outstand-
ing affective dimension was fear/anxiety. Every participant expressed 
fear, with the subject mentioned on 48 different occasions. Seven par-
ticipants expressed fear for the health and future of children, while 
fear about children eating local food or drinking water, playing in the 
soil, or swimming in the ocean, and fears for their future, were widely 
acknowledged. Figure 3 illustrates a summer festival where children 
cannot help but get muddy. One father expressed,
Even if we the adults ate it, I didn’t want to feed the children those 
crops. . . . I had anxiety. Anxiety for the future of my children. My 
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children also got the checkups but I am always worried, what if that 
result was not accurate?
Seven participants specifically mentioned fear/anxiety about food 
safety. Responses covered damaged industry, for example, one par-
ticipant shared that “for the fishermen and vegetable shop owners. 
They may not be able to sell their goods.” The apple farmer said that 
he considered leaving Fukushima to start over because people would 
assume that because he was in Fukushima, his apples would have high 
levels of radiation. Even if he checked and they did not, people might 
not trust their safety. Many participants decided to check radiation 
levels for food they had personally grown at the town hall. 
In addition to fear/anxiety about children and food was a general fear 
of invisible, unknown aspects of radiation. One 80-year-old participant 
said, “I am a farmer and radiation is something that can’t be seen.” Par-
ticipants expressed a continued fear stemming from a general feeling 
FIGURE 3 Children play water games on a rainy day during Shinchimachi’s summer 
festival, which attracts residents of villages along the Fukushima coastline. Before 
the festival, the park had its top layer of grass and dirt removed in an attempt to 
lower the ground radiation (Kwesell, 2013).
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of “uncertainty” and this led to felt ailments or somatic symptoms. As 
demonstrated in Figure 4, they are constantly reminded of the higher 
levels of radiation as the village is dotted with radiation counters. One 
participant mentioned, “I don’t know. About the radiation. About the 
nuclear disaster. When I feel a little ill, my mind immediately goes on 
thinking that it is because of radiation.”
The second most often mentioned affective dimension was sadness/ 
depression, which was mentioned by 8 participants a total of 20 times by 
expressing sadness, depression, or a feeling of separation and rejection. 
Participants said, “So sad that we have come to such a level” and “I was 
hurt just hearing about it.” One radiation evacuee said that her family all 
used to live together yet are now split across four places in three differ-
ent prefectures. For her, depression lasted about 1–2 years, and sadness 
stemmed from a mixture of feeling alone and seeing negative Internet 
comments, which she characterized as “painful.” One grandmother 
expressed a deep sadness of “rejection” when her children stopped 
FIGURE 4 A child plays with a radiation counter in Shinchimachi’s largest park. 
Public parks, open areas, and school playgrounds all have radiation counters after 
the nuclear disaster (Kwesell, 2012).
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accepting homegrown food she sent. Sadness also stemmed from the 
very dichotomy of living in a place surrounded by nature yet fearing 
it. Another participant shared, “[My children] have never gone to the 
sea. They pass by it in the car but haven’t gone to the beach. We live 
in a place where the nature surrounds us—both the mountain and the 
sea. But it is so sad they can’t go to the ocean.” A few participants also 
expressed anger about outsiders’ views of Fukushima, yet, despite the 
many difficult affective responses elicited from interviews, feelings of 
community support were also expressed. One participant noted that he 
felt a sense of peace: “because I have all my family and friends and the 
community, I am okay.”
Cognitive. All of the cognitive dimensions discussed in litera-
ture were mentioned by participants, while the most outstanding was 
concerns about outsiders’ negative image or misinformation about Fu-
kushima, expressed by all participants a total of 73 times. They com-
municated that everything related to Fukushima after the nuclear ac-
cident is now grouped together into one long-lasting negative image. 
One participant said that the first impression is “engraved in people’s 
minds” and will thus “continue.” They expressed being disliked and 
avoided, and one noted that tourists no longer want to visit the pre-
fecture. The Fukushima stigma was expressed as a misunderstanding. 
One participant shared, “It’s almost as though people think you get 
cancer from just hearing the term Fukushima.” Eight people thought 
that others might think it is hard for Fukushima women to get mar-
ried or have healthy children. In addition, respondents mentioned the 
historical reference from the aftermath of the atomic bombing and 
people’s resulting negative attitudes toward women, marriage, and the 
ability to bear healthy children.
Eight people mentioned that others assume Fukushima prefecture 
and its people, objects, and food are contagious. Some reported their 
cars being vandalized, while others were asked if their cars were con-
tagious. Two participants shared that Fukushima children who went 
to school in another prefecture after the disaster were called “dirty.”
The second most often mentioned cognitive dimension was changed 
priorities and values. Ten participants expressed such changes a total 
of 33 times. One participant noted,
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When I was doing dead body searches and finding bodies every day . . . 
I felt, there is a reason that I am alive today. I need to do something for 
the community . . . living with a purpose. . . . So before, my priority was 
the business, but now . . . I want to contribute to making Shinchimachi 
a better place for all.
Others expressed that family time and bonding had become es-
sential priorities. One participant noted, “Now, if we can go through 
a day peacefully, then I am happy. If I can spend a good time with my 
grandchildren, I am happy. . . . I just want to live peacefully with my 
husband.”
Nine participants expressed self-efficacy and six expressed collective 
efficacy. The apple farmer is now experimenting with a new technique to 
grow tastier apples more efficiently. Before the disaster, he did not have 
much of a plan to expand, and for 2 years after, he felt overwhelmed 
and stuck. Then he slowly regained footing and started having new 
ideas and dreams. Several participants expressed future thinking by 
continually thinking about participating in rebuilding the village. Par-
ticipants experienced a desire to support one another, join together to 
fight against stigma, and share a fuller story of Fukushima, illustrating 
that residents continue “carrying on with their li[ves].” In addition, they 
spoke about a desire to share what they called a real or more inclusive 
story of Fukushima rather than the partial or negative story shared by 
the mass media. One participant noted, “So although we are victims, we 
still have power and energy to do something more for the community. 
Not just asking for help from outside but helping ourselves.”
Behavioral. The most outstanding behavioral dimension was ac-
tively resisting stigma, expressed by all participants on 19 occasions. 
Eight mentioned verbally claiming they are from Fukushima as “honest 
fact.” One said, “I would say that I am from Fukushima with confidence 
and pride.” Another shared, “I was born here and there is nothing to 
hide from it.” Four participants mentioned actively working to change 
Fukushima’s negative image and experiencing some frustrations doing 
so. One shared, “This part of Fukushima, radiation levels only reached 
to this level, so it is not a problem. Although we try to spread this fact 
ourselves, it seems that the public is unwilling to accept.”
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The second most salient behavioral dimension was community 
support and involvement, mentioned by 8 participants, and witnessing 
enacted stigma, mentioned by 11. One participant said her husband 
postponed his retirement as the community needed electricians. The 
apple farmer noted that while he lost outside clients, his community 
kept buying apples. One business owner transformed his life by starting 
a nonprofit organization that supports victims of the disaster, children, 
and elders in the community.
Eleven participants had either witnessed enacted stigma directly 
or heard about it happening both outside and within the prefecture. 
One participant shared, “Children get bullied at school for being from 
Fukushima . . . even within Fukushima.” Cars were mentioned being 
damaged, “wretched and scratched because they had a Fukushima 
number plate.” People who fled their homes were shown that they were 
unwelcome in the new place. One participant shared, “Even within 
Fukushima, when a family moved to Iwaki from the evacuation area 
and went around to greet their new neighbors, gifts that they had 
given were returned to their doorstep the next day because of where 
they were from.”
Participants also expressed social withdrawal and concealing being 
from Fukushima. Family friendships were broken and contact lost with 
people who fled Fukushima, and one person mentioned that she had 
stopped sending gifts to family outside because the gifts did not feel 
welcome. One said that it was too exhausting to tell foreigners where 
he was from: “When I go abroad I say I am from Sendai, Japan. I went 
to America, China, a lot of places, but never say Fukushima because 
people will react to Fukushima—even foreigners.”
Perceived Sources of Stigma (RQ2)
With regard to perceived sources of stigma, all research participants 
mentioned the media in general terms, and some mentioned spe-
cific forms of media, such as television, Internet, and newspapers. In 
addition, they mentioned the Japanese government, Tokyo Electric 
Power Company (TEPCO), and interpersonal contacts/rumors as 
sources.
The most dominant perceived source of stigma mentioned was the 
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general term media by all participants 70 times, while most did not 
report the kind of media. They expressed that the media did not show 
the full story, mistold the story, or lied. The media was criticized for 
deceiving and for lacking information. One participant claimed to “only 
believe what I see with my own eyes.”
Three participants suggested that the media only shares choice 
elements to create “tears” or “entertain.” Two specifically mentioned 
that a story is written and published despite fact-based knowledge. 
To one participant, the media’s portrayals bring mistrust: “When I see 
such newspapers and magazines, the first thing I feel is anger. I can’t 
trust these.” 
Television, newspaper, and online sources. Six participants men-
tioned television as a specific source of stigma. One spoke of reports of 
victims of the 2016 Kumamoto, Japan, earthquake refusing donations 
from Fukushima: “There are some who would accept, but even now, 
there are some people who see us like that. I learned that from watch-
ing the TV.” Four participants mentioned newspapers (either online or 
offline) as a source of stigma. One said that a local newspaper reported 
only on radiation fallout and failed cleanup attempts: “They only say 
negative things. I wish that they would say more about what should be 
done construction-wise or portray it in a way that makes us more hope-
ful.” Three participants specifically blamed online sources for contagion 
rumor. One participant noted, “I have seen on the Internet and media, 
things like radiation is contagious so you shouldn’t go near them.”
Government and TEPCO. Seven participants mentioned the Japa-
nese government as a source of stigma, and four mentioned TEPCO. 
One mentioned that people only accept news as fact and that news 
comes from sources of structural power. One said that he “feels fool-
ish” for believing the government and TEPCO. The media’s immediate 
disaster report put one participant’s family in danger: “We fled to Shi-
rakawa. But in reality, it turned out that the radiation level was higher 
than that of Shinchimachi. We lacked information back then.”
Interpersonal contacts and rumors. Five participants mentioned 
the cause of stigma to be interpersonal contacts and rumors. They noted 
that while the media created and shared the story, influences lay equally 
in the minds of media audiences and the meanings they derived:
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I don’t think it’s the media’s fault. . . . I think people exaggerated how 
they processed the information, automatically making things worse in 
their heads—that the condition of the nuclear reactors is worse than 
what is told, that all of Fukushima is now not functioning, that every 
part of Fukushima has been contaminated.
Participants seemed to differentiate between physical damage by 
the earthquake, tsunami, or forced evacuation and damage created by 
rumors, which “hurt in nonvisible ways. . . . Most people, they take in 
the information just as it is delivered. That leads to rumors and stereo-
types.” In addition, some participants mentioned the feeling that the 
rest of Japan had them under a microscope, as if they were interested 
in the lives of Fukushima people “like rats in a science experiment.”
Overall, participants expressed wanting more transparency: for the 
media, government, and TEPCO to share truth and for news not to 
be swayed in an overly positive or negative way. They wanted victims’ 
personal stories shared as well as facts that could offer them a chance 
to make their own informed decisions about safety.
Discussion
Summary and Implications of the Results
The stigma perceived by the participants in Shinchimachi reveals their 
newly emerged identity in relation to the rest of Japan as a prefecture 
of radiation. Affectively, they felt anxious and sad about the new cir-
cumstances that suddenly emerged out of their control. Cognitively, 
they were highly concerned about negative views about Fukushima 
among “outsiders.” Behaviorally, they actively resisted the stigma while 
strengthening their connections and belonging to their own community.
One important finding in this study is that while stigma has nega-
tive connotations, participants did not all exhibit negative effects from 
stigma. Similar to what Goffman (1963) proposed, people think through 
stigmas following an initial emotional reaction and experience varying 
degrees of efficacy. As noted in several past studies (Link & Phelan, 
2001; Southall, Gagné, & Jennings, 2010; Steward et al., 2008), stigma 
causes people to rethink values, priorities, goals and dreams and even 
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encourages them to become more involved in the conception of a 
desired future. Shinchimachi was perceived to be stronger as people 
supported one another and actively strengthened ties to resist stigma. 
The village’s reputation was likely damaged as a part of Fukushima, and 
physical dangers remain ambiguous. Despite this, self- and collective 
efficacy were expressed even 5 years after the disaster.
The willingness to resist the Fukushima stigma may enable partici-
pants to speak out more actively about needed policy change to keep 
them safe both physically and socially. If there were better communica-
tion channels through which residents of affected areas could express 
their thoughts and feelings within and outside of their communities, 
more accurate information could be conveyed and shared. Results 
concerning sources of stigma formation offer valuable implications for 
people’s dependency on the mass media and interpersonal contacts in 
disaster situations. Although the mass media has been previously proven 
as the main source of information in ambiguous times (Ball-Rokeach, 
1985, 1998; Hirschburg et al., 1986), some participants expressed such 
a high level of mistrust in the media that they relied on interpersonal 
communication for information. Consistent with the media framing 
literature (Entman, 1993; Gamson & Modigliani, 1989; Goffman, 1974), 
participants found that stories mostly followed precreated dramatized 
frames, from which they felt stigma originated. They mentioned that 
journalists arrived on scene with stories that had already been written 
and were mostly looking to find quotes to match their angles (Durkheim, 
1933; Puhl et al., 2005). Results indicate that people’s dependency on 
different types of information sources in disaster situations is likely to 
be influenced by their trust in the framing of stories in the mass media. 
Future studies can further reveal the relationship between dependency 
on media in disaster situations and the effects of framed content.
The most salient stigma attributes expressed were fear and, interest-
ingly, a desire to resist stigma. Past studies have found that the stigma-
tizers can have fear toward people with a diagnosed ailment (Berger, 
1995; Berger et al., 2001). In a different angle, fear and anxiety from the 
stigmatized likely stem from lack of information (Rubin, 1987). The 
present study offers new data that sheds light on a more illusive sense of 
fear. The participants feared their current situation and future because of 
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radiation, which they cannot see and the physiological effects of which 
they do not fully understand. But they also felt that other people feared 
those who were exposed. These fears could not be tangibly defined 
because of radiation’s elusive characteristic, and there is no direct situa-
tion to which they can be compared. This phenomenon of fears created 
by the multifaceted layers of stigma and self-stigma effects builds on 
more direct stigma-induced fear research (Zhuang et al., 2016). Based 
on Rubin’s (1987) findings, one way to alleviate fear is to offer victims 
full information. In the case of future crises, information structures 
and dispersal networks could help alleviate fears in unforeseen and 
overwhelming situations. The interplay of fear and the resistance of 
stigma is worth further exploration.
Suggestions for Future Crisis Communications
We make three suggestions for future crisis communication strategies 
based on our findings. Stigma takes place when information is lack-
ing and rumors begin to spread (Flynn, Slovic, & Kunreuther, 2001; 
Goffman, 1963). Open and clear communication about risk and public 
health issues can mitigate the long-term negative effects of self-stigma 
(Maeda & Oe, 2017). First, a multichannel flow of information would 
minimize the spread of inaccurate rumors and allow more options for 
vicarious learning beyond the mass media–centric story. Special atten-
tion would be needed to make information accessible to all individuals 
in the at-risk population. In an aging community like Shinchimachi, 
many of the elders might not have access to the Internet or use social 
media. The present research indicates that interpersonal channels 
and the local media play an important role in crisis communication. 
Future research can examine effective and accessible means of infor-
mation dispersal in immediate disaster response and reconstruction 
phases engaging all forms of mainstream, local, and social media and 
a more structured response including small groups and face-to-face 
information dispersal. Many interviewees expressed confusion owing 
to a lack of information on the health effects of radiation. Rather than 
not communicating information because of an inability to agree on 
facts, multiple perspectives about disaster and risks entailed should 
be presented so that people can make informed and rational decisions.
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Second, disaster response and communication strategies should 
include ways for residents to talk openly about their difficulties, uncer-
tainties, and frustrations. Several interviewees mentioned the frustra-
tion of not being able confide in others about what they experienced 
due to the stigma and sensitivity of the disaster. In the immediate 
aftermath of a disaster, informal group conversation can be carried out 
at evacuation shelters with community leaders spreading information 
and encouraging open discussion. With respect to a more long-term 
aftermath, therapeutic interventions can include more formal discus-
sion groups. This would allow victims to share information in a safe 
space, voice anxieties and concerns, and come to some agreement on 
strategies moving forward.
Third, crisis communication experts should put immediate focus 
on local media and encourage them to take on active roles to overcome 
negative effects by mainstream media’s framed stories. Local media 
should provide focused information on the local area and publish more 
stories and voices from local citizens. Print, television, and radio, in 
addition to the Internet, could help disperse information to diverse 
groups of people. Local media can offer vital information and likely 
lessen the long-term effects of self-stigma.
Limitations and Future Research
The limitations of our study should be mentioned. This qualitative 
study focused on understanding stigma from the perspective of crisis 
survivors and, thus, did not to attempt to generalize findings to all Fu-
kushima survivors. Findings from this study could help develop scales 
for future survey research on stigmatized disaster survivors.
Shinchimachi is an aging community, and new generations often 
move to cities for university, while few young people return. The par-
ticipants’ age range reflected this trend to an extent yet was still too 
heavily weighted toward elderly people and would benefit from more 
inquiry with younger generations. Future research with a larger capacity 
in a wider area of Fukushima prefecture would offer more insight into 
the more general stigma perceived by Fukushima residents.
Despite these limitations, this study makes an important contri-
bution to the field of crisis communication by uncovering multiple 
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dimensions of stigma perceived by Fukushima residents and how the 
residents are coping with the imposed stigma. The study lays a basis 
for future research on stigma, disaster, crisis communication, and re-
covery. The study also suggests that researchers in this field should be 
aware of the challenges of accessing the sensitive research population. 
Many residents of Fukushima were hesitant to participate in disaster-
related interviews with researchers from outside of Fukushima in 
ongoing circumstances of having to cope with psychological trauma 
in a stigmatized place and with unknowns of future radiation-related 
health issues. These challenges make further research with this type 
of population both challenging and valuable.
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Note
1. The first author, Allison Kwesell, is a photojournalist and has been 
documenting the lives of the people of Fukushima since 2011. Several of her 
photographs are included as figures.
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ABSTRACT
This study explores the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 explosion crisis by analyzing posts on Twitter in 
three nations: the United States, Australia, and South Korea. Using the perspectives of generic 
frames, issue-specifi c frames, cross-national frames, and user sentiment on Twitter, this study 
analyzes 600 posts (200 from each nation). Results reveal that Twitter posts frequently framed 
the crisis using attribution, morality, and confl ict frames. Posts about the explosion were more 
professional frame oriented than national frame oriented. Negative sentiment was dominant in 
Twitter posts about the explosion. Morality, corporate breakdown, and customer concerns were 
highly associated with negative sentiment. The results demonstrate how global users respond 
to a corporate crisis. Study implications and suggestions are discussed.
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A corporate crisis shapes the reputation of the corporation aff ected, 
public opinion regarding the corporation, and the economy of the 
nation where the crisis occurs (An & Gower, 2009). Media coverage 
of a corporate crisis can infl uence corporations, governments, and 
stakeholders to a substantial degree. A crisis is a stage of an event at 
which future events can be better or worse. Such future events un-
fold depending on the causes, attributions, and solutions of the crisis 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2004). As such, how the public views a crisis is 
an important factor in determining the fate of involved organizations. 
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In communication research, an indispensable step toward identifying 
the effects of a corporate crisis is to examine how the crisis is framed 
in media because how media frame a corporate crisis facilitates or 
deteriorates publics’ attitudes and behaviors toward the corporation 
(Coombs, 2006; Valentini & Romenti, 2011).
In recent years, media message production and distribution have 
transformed in an interactive way (Hindman, 2009). Audiences readily 
engage with people by sharing, endorsing, or opposing posts on social 
media. Audiences offer opinions on issues in interactive news platforms 
(Diehl, Weeks, & Gil de Zúñiga, 2016). Furthermore, as J. Kim, Brossard, 
Scheufele, and Xenos (2016) also discussed, the sentiment shared on 
social media about a crisis influences how audiences perceive the issue. 
Given the increasing impact of social media posts on users regarding 
active internalizing (viewing) and externalizing (sharing or retweeting; 
Diehl et al., 2016), it is crucial to investigate how message frames relate 
to audience sentiment, which can form public opinion.
Crisis information is disseminated faster on social media than 
other news channels due to users’ direct posts on sites, virality, and 
global reach, which make the crisis’s impact powerful (van der Meer & 
Verhoeven, 2013). When a massive earthquake and tsunami caused a 
nuclear accident in Japan in 2011, one particular article about the crisis 
was the most shared story on Facebook that year (Facebook, 2011). For 
this reason, researchers are concerned with how issues, frames, opin-
ions, and sentiment on social media influence public perceptions of 
a crisis at an international level (Hajdu, Pápay, Szántó, & Tóth, 2018). 
Even though several researchers have focused on social media content 
related to crises (e.g., Ceron, 2015; J. Kim et al., 2016) and users’ issue-
sharing intentions (Khuntia, Sun, & Yim, 2016), scant research has 
been conducted on corporate crisis framing and on relating framing 
to sentiment in an international context. Hence, using a recent global 
corporate crisis as a case, this study seeks to (a) track which frames 
frequently occurred in social media posts; (b) explore online sentiment 
toward the brand, product, and crisis; and (c) demonstrate the relation-
ship between message frames and audience sentiment.
The current study conducted a social media content analysis of the 
Samsung Galaxy Note 7 explosion crisis, which caused serious safety 
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concerns (e.g., possible explosion in an airplane that can affect safety) 
and public fear (Ferreras, 2016; McGregor, 2016). This crisis received 
national and international attention because of the product’s almost 
ubiquitous penetration across the world (“Worldwide Smartphone 
Sales,” 2016). A global corporate crisis can, however, cause a falsely 
assumed universality of the issue if the crisis is examined only in one 
nation (Dogan & Pelassy, 1984) because international crisis news has 
been known to have ethnocentric biases in terms of both events and 
geographic focus (de Vreese, Peter, & Semetko, 2001). However, exam-
ining social media posts on a crisis in multiple nations offers a way to 
identify how the crisis is framed depending on national backgrounds 
(Swanson, 2000). To ensure a comprehensive observation and assess-
ment, this study explores the Samsung crisis by analyzing posts on social 
media in three different nations: the United States, Australia, and South 
Korea. The three nations are chosen because they represented the high-
est smartphone penetration rates in the world at the time of the incident 
(McPhillips, 2016). South Korea and the United States manufactured 
the top three smartphones sold in the world: the Samsung Galaxy S7 
(South Korea), the Apple iPhone 7 (United States), and the LG G5 
(South Korea; Triggs, 2016). Australia was the nation where Samsung 
Galaxy had the largest market share, followed by South Korea (Nino, 
2017). Identifying social media post frames and comparing them with 
user sentiment in these nations can provide clues for effective public 
relations (PR) strategies, corporate reputation recovery, and negative 
affect reduction.
Crisis Framing and Cross-National Communication
When a crisis is framed, certain aspects of the crisis are reemphasized 
as salient attributes. This slanted coverage affects how audiences per-
ceive, organize, and interpret events and issues (de Vreese et al., 2001; 
Entman, 1993). Frames in media refer to the central idea of organizing 
and providing meaning to a selection of attributes by selection, presenta-
tion, and exclusion (Nelson, Clawson, & Oxley, 1997). In other words, 
to frame is to select, organize, and define certain themes and aspects 
of reality and to emphasize events, issues, and actors of the agenda 
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to make them prominent (Entman, 2004). For example, the Chinese 
news media framed recalled Chinese products as “unavoidable” and 
“exaggerated Western media,” whereas the U.S. news media framed 
them as “worrisome” or from a “broken system” (Hong, 2013, p. 86).
In crisis communication, frames can shape the public’s attribution 
of crisis responsibility to organizations, governments, and stakeholders. 
Crisis frames can influence the public’s reputation perception, senti-
ment, behavioral intention toward the organization in crisis, and the 
organization’s rebuild strategy (Coombs, 2007). Media play a central 
role in this process because the way a crisis is framed can shape the 
attributes of the crisis. Media select which issues to report in organi-
zations’ crisis responses, such as cause and responsibility, frames that 
influence audience sentiment (Coombs, 2006).
Framing can be labeled on varying levels and applications in the 
international context. The levels in framing are generic frames, issue-
specific frames, and cross-national frames (de Vreese, 2005). Generic 
frames represent a broad range of aspects of a topic in different cultural 
contexts (de Vreese et al., 2001; Guo, Holton, & Jeong, 2012) and pro-
vide a common analytical framework in terms of strategic aspects of 
the agenda (Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). Issue-specific frames, on the 
other hand, pertain to detailed categories of an event (de Vreese, 2005) 
and present different issues from event to event. Issue-specific frames, 
hence, anatomize an event and enable the audience to understand the 
event in fine detail. Cross-national frames concern identities embed-
ded in international issue coverage. In the cross-national comparative 
framing model, Guo et al. (2012) stated that media coverage is affected 
by culture, national identity, and/or politically driven frames. Different 
nations may use distinct frames to cover identical issues.
Generic Frames
Generic frames are used in analyses about crises to explain commonly 
categorized frames occurring in an agenda (An & Gower, 2009). In 
this view, generic frames are defined as frames that are universally 
applicable to an agenda. Neuman, Just, and Crigler (1992) categorized 
types of frames dominant in the U.S. news media into four catego-
ries: conflict, economic consequences, human impact, and morality. 
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Semetko and Valkenburg (2000) added attribution of responsibility 
to these four frames in accounting for crises. These five news frames 
are a generalization of crises, which can be applied to different nations 
(de Vreese et al., 2001).
Conflict frames in the media emphasize disagreement among indi-
viduals, groups, or organizations in the crisis as a means of capturing 
audience interest. An and Gower (2009) found that over 64% of analyzed 
news contained conflict frames. For example, U.S. newspapers framed 
the Fukushima nuclear power plant crisis as a conflict that could in-
duce audience cynicism (Lazic & Kaigo, 2013). Economic consequence 
frames report a crisis event in terms of the impact the crisis will have 
economically on individuals, groups, organizations, and nations (An 
& Gower, 2009; Neuman et al., 1992). Economic frames are considered 
important because the consequences of the frames can affect the market 
and the nation.
Human interest frames emphasize psychological and emotional 
angles in a crisis (Semetko & Valkenburg, 2000). Media are likely to 
cover feelings of outrage, empathy, sympathy, or compassion to capture 
and retain audience interest. Nabi (2002) discovered that different 
versions of news stories on domestic terrorism—each of which was 
designed to elicit anger and fear—induced different emotions from 
study participants. H. J. Kim and Cameron (2011) experimented with 
consumer responses to a cell phone battery explosion accident. In their 
study, sadness-inducing news predicted a positive attitude toward the 
corporation.
Morality frames look at a crisis in the context of religious or moral 
prescriptions (Neuman et al., 1992). Media coverage includes moral 
judgments such that a crisis is portrayed as preventable or unavoidable 
indirectly through quotations or inference. The morality frame concerns 
news coverage of any ethical action the entity takes to resolve the crisis.
Responsibility attribution frames suggest that news attributes re-
sponsibility for a crisis to either individual (episodic) or society (the-
matic; Iyengar, 1991). According to attribution theory (B. Weiner, 1993), 
people attribute causes of issues to behaviors. Responsibility attribution 
depends on the nature of a problem. Individual responsibility pertains 
to an emphasis on the cause of a problem (e.g., personal), whereas social 
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responsibility focuses on the people who have the power to control the 
problem (e.g., a government, a corporation; Kang, 2013).
Issue-Specific Frames
Issue-specific frames investigate events in customized specificity because 
each event consists of a different list of issues. Anchoring ideas frame an 
event and become socially represented. In this process, some issues are 
neglected, and some are emphasized (Flick, 1998). Issue-specific frames 
can be explained as anchoring. Anchoring is the process of reducing 
and transforming unfamiliar ideas into categories and images (Schmitz, 
Filippone, & Edelman, 2003). Through the anchoring process, certain 
issues are woven into the acceptable knowledge of audiences. Therefore 
knowing issues in one’s own views can determine the way in which the 
audience perceives and understands issues.
Crisis topics such as U.S. national budget deficits (Jasperson, Shah, 
Watts, Faber, & Fan, 1998), international airline accidents (Entman, 
1991), or the Gulf War (Reese & Buckalew, 1995) contain unique issues. 
In their study on the news media coverage of Alitalia’s crisis, Valentini 
and Romenti (2011) found that the domestic press’s top four issues were 
the financial situation, investor relations, government management, 
and employee relations. The international press’s top four issues were 
investor relations, the financial situation, government management, 
and labor union relations (Valentini & Romenti, 2011). Hong (2013) 
discovered that the news media covered issues of product quality, 
customer concern, and a systemic breakdown in the corporate crisis 
of recalled Chinese products. When a crisis is involved with a product 
or a service of a corporation, news issues cover a variety of issues, in-
cluding the recall, side effects, scientific research evidence, complaints, 
lawsuits, the investigation, prevention, the crisis cause, and potential 
crisis solutions (D. Weiner, 2006).
Cross-National Frames
Characteristics of media organizations can affect media frames (Shoe-
maker & Reese, 1996). Some media organizations are conservative 
or liberal (Cooper, 2002; Entman, 2010; Snow & Benford, 1992). The 
political ideology of media organizations can affect framing (Scheufele, 
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1999). In the process of framing, media organizations interpret social 
issues differently depending on their political motivations or economic 
needs (Simon & Xenos, 2000).
At the macrolevel, the frames of ethnocentrism, nationalism, and 
professionalism influence the objectivity of coverage (Gans, 1979; Gary-
antes & Murphy, 2010). The national frame refers mainly to the domes-
tication and localization of news stories for national interest (Nossek, 
2004). For example, economic issues are more heavily influenced 
by national interests because monetary profits are directly involved 
(Graber, 1993; Neuman et al., 1992). Cultural differences, ideologies, 
nationalism, norms, values, routines, physical distance, and business 
interest can influence media coverage (Garyantes & Murphy, 2010; 
Shoemaker & Reese 1996). Media organizations may apply the national 
frame to economic or corporate crises (Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). The 
national frame and national interest frame served as a driving force 
of crisis coverage in Asia and Europe (Mao, 2014), which became a 
reconstructing factor of reality in general.
Meanwhile, the professional frame accounts for a fact-based news 
report rather than news framed with a slant (Nossek, 2004). When 
journalists (both professionals and citizens) report international crisis 
news, they tend to frame it as either “ours” or “theirs.” After that, the 
professional frame (theirs) becomes subordinate to the national frame 
(our crisis; Nossek, 2004).
Studies have found evidence of cultural filtering in foreign event 
coverage, indicating that media organizations apply the “our” (na-
tional) frame rather than the “their” (professional) frame to the news 
for the benefit of their nations (Stevenson & Cole, 1984; Wu, 2000). For 
instance, with the national frame, the U.S. media attributed responsi-
bility for the 2013 Asiana Airlines crash to the pilots and problematic 
management of the flight. South Korean and Chinese media were less 
negative toward the corporation than were U.S. news media (Yan & 
Kim, 2015). In another airplane crisis, Entman (1991) found vastly dif-
ferent media frames based on national interest in covering international 
airline tragedies. The U.S. downing of an Iranian plane was framed as a 
technical accident, while the Soviet downing of a South Korean airline 
plane was depicted as a moral outrage.
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Sentiment Research on Social Media
A crisis issue is shared or tweeted on social media through informa-
tion interactions. Such user-driven news creation/sharing activities 
constitute (a) social media agenda setting at the first level (i.e., the news 
media set an agenda on social media) and at the second level (i.e., at-
tributes of the issue become salient or insignificant on social media), 
(b) user comments and decisions on the issue (Schultz, Utz, & Göritz, 
2011). In this process of information interaction, users gain the power 
to collaboratively build crisis frames on social media (van der Meer & 
Verhoeven, 2013), and the media tone set on social media news posts 
about crisis issues might affect the public’s sentiment toward the issues 
(J. Kim et al., 2016).
Sentiment analysis has been used widely in social media research 
because it can measure feelings toward communication in an interface. 
Sentiment on social media is defined as the attitudinal valence of users’ 
mentions (Homburg, Ehm, & Artz, 2015). In other words, social media 
posts about a crisis in terms of sentiment can be viewed as negative, 
positive, or neutral (Choi & Lin, 2009). Users express negative emotions 
with anger or fear. The neutral response can be fact sharing. Positive 
emotions can include relief and sympathy. In dealing with crisis issues, 
people tend to seek more social cues to check the climate of major-
ity opinions on issues because they want to be harmonious with the 
socially desirable and normative expectations of others (J. Kim et al., 
2016). Past research shows that people are likely to pay attention to cri-
sis communication via social media more than they do via traditional 
media because social media provide not only real-time information but 
also social cues, such as user comments (Brummette & Fussell, 2015; 
Utz, Schultz, & Glocka, 2013). Hence the sentiment analysis of crisis 
communication on social media could provide a social cue for gauging 
public attitudes on the issue (J. Kim et al., 2016).
Drawn from the review of framing in corporate crises and social 
media, this study posits that social media posts about the Samsung 
Galaxy Note 7 explosion consist of crisis frames and sentiment. Research 
questions reflecting the inquiries are as follows:
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RQ1: How are generic frames (RQ1a), issue-specific frames (RQ1b), 
and cross-national frames (RQ1c) about the Samsung crisis used in 
social media posts?
RQ2: How is sentiment about the Samsung crisis posts used on social 
media?
RQ3: How do generic frames (RQ3a), issue-specific frames (RQ3b), 
and cross-national frames (RQ3c) for the Samsung crisis relate to 
sentiment?
Method
Sampling Procedure
This study used the search keyword “Samsung Galaxy Note 7” for the 
United States, Australia, and South Korea on Twitter. From the three 
nations, the search between August 1, 2016, and January 31, 2017, yielded 
549,424 tweets from the United States, 24,628 tweets from Australia, 
and 5,036 tweets from South Korea, totaling 579,088 tweets. We used 
Synthesio as the data collection platform.
The coding period was set for two reasons. First, the Galaxy Note 7 
model was released to the public on August 2, 2016. The first explosion 
was reported on August 19, 2016, in South Korea. Second, after a series 
of explosions, recalls, bans on carrying the Galaxy Note 7 on flights, 
and suspended production of the phone, Samsung officially announced 
the cause of the explosion on January 22, 2017. This study analyzed the 
tweets during the entire timeline of the explosion.
Twitter is used as a social media platform in analysis for several 
reasons. Twitter provides a ready source of data for researchers inter-
ested in public opinion. Twitter, with its 140-character posts,1 consists 
of news, tables, statistics, and charts (Driscoll & Walker, 2014). For both 
professional and citizen journalists, Twitter is a supportive resource for 
reporting, delivering, and sharing information. Twitter is used as an 
information source for crises more than other social media platforms 
because it is fast and up to date. On Twitter, users post “trending top-
ics” with hashtags and links. For this reason, researchers and journal-
ists rely on Twitter for interpreting and giving context to news events 
(Valenzuela, Puente, & Flores, 2017). In addition to the general merits 
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of Twitter mentioned earlier, another reason for using Twitter is that it 
enables an equal comparison of the three nations. In this sense, Twit-
ter is a more appropriate content source for the analysis of the three 
nations than other popular platforms, such as Naver (the largest web 
portal in South Korea), Facebook, and YouTube.
Three individuals participated in the data coding procedures and 
took charge of each nation (United States, Australia, and South Korea). 
Using a systematic data collection approach, the coders chose the first 
tweet of each day in each month. The selection yielded 184 tweets (30 
for September and November; 31 for August, October, December, and 
January). Then, by selecting the three months with the most tweets, 
the remaining 16 posts were chosen (N = 200). They were six from 
the top 2 months (n = 12) and four from the third month (n = 4). Fol-
lowing the coding rules, a total of 600 tweets (200 from each nation) 
were drawn for analysis. While most Twitter studies use large samples, 
several framing studies have analyzed a sample size similar to the cur-
rent study’s. Framing studies on Twitter use relatively small samples out 
of many posts because aspects and valence are represented better by 
manual coding than with big data (e.g., García-Perdomo, 2017; Manor 
& Crilley, 2018; Pond & Lewis, 2019).
Coding Instrument
The unit of analysis is a Twitter post. The first coding scheme consisted 
of generic and issue-specific frames (An & Gower, 2009; Flick, 1998). 
Five generic frames were applied to the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 explo-
sion case: conflict, economic consequences, human impact, morality, 
and attribution (presence = 1, absence = 0; Table 1). Since the Samsung 
case is concerned with a product, framing items from previous re-
search about news media coverage of products were used (Hong, 2013; 
Valentini & Romenti, 2011). The adjusted items in the Samsung Note 
7 explosion context are product quality, customer concern, corporate 
breakdown, recall, side effect, evidence, employee, lawsuit, business 
expert, investigation, prevention, government, cause, solution, safety, 
and design (presence = 1, absence = 0; Table 1). There were no additional 
frame items to create in the coding process, which met the conceptual 
saturation of frames.
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The coders also judged whether the posts contained aspects of the 
national frame (on the side of the nation; coded as 2), the professional 
frame (objective report; coded as 1), or not identified (coded as 0; 
Nossek, 2004; Table 1). Regarding sentiment, the coding categories 
were positive (2), neutral (1), and negative (0). When a post contained 
a relieving, sympathetic, or favorable comment, it was coded as posi-
tive (e.g., “Samsung Galaxy Note 7’s iris scanner might be the coolest 
smartphone feature ever”). Posts containing fact sharing were coded as 
neutral (e.g., “Here are some pics of Samsung Galaxy Note 7”). When a 
user expressed a negative emotion with anger or fear in the post, it was 
coded as negative (e.g., “Samsung Galaxy Note 7 disappoints; iPhone 
7 wins before launch?”). The validity of the coding was cross-checked 
in intercoder reliability tests.
Intercoder Reliability
Three coders participated in intercoder reliability tests. The coder of the 
U.S. sample drew 10% of the Australian data. The coder of the Australian 
sample drew 10% of the South Korean data. The coder of the South 
Korean sample drew 10% of the U.S. data. All three coders conducted 
Cohen’s kappa for intercoder agreement of categorical data. Therefore 
the three-nation data were cross-checked to ensure that coding reached 
a mutual consensus. A few variable discrepancies were present on the 
first attempt. After discussion, the reliability tests yielded acceptable 
kappas (see Table 1 for individual kappa values). Overall, the average of 
the three-nation reliability tests was acceptable, with a Cohen’s kappa 
value of .83 (Landis & Koch, 1977).
Findings
Frequency analyses and Cramer’s V correlations for categorical data 
were conducted for the posed research questions. RQ1a asked about the 
distribution of generic frames in posts about the Samsung crisis (Table 
2). Table 2 demonstrates that tweets about the crisis most frequently 
included attribution (n = 131), followed by morality (n = 106), conflict 
(n = 61), and economic consequence (n = 60). Generic frames were 
posted in October 2016 (n = 95) the most, followed by September (n = 
85) and November (n = 78).
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RQ1b questioned how issue-specific frames were posted on Twitter 
during the incident period (August 2016–January 2017; Table 3). The 
result showed that tweets were highly focused on corporate breakdown 
(Samsung’s crisis due to explosions; n = 406). The product quality issue 
was the second most tweeted topic during the incident period (n = 154), 
followed by fire (n = 136), recall (n = 117), and side effects (n = 103). The 
least tweeted issue was business expert sources (n = 14).
RQ1c asked about the distribution of cross-national frames (national 
or professional). Analysis revealed that there were more posts about the 
professional frame (n = 104) than the national frame (n = 4), though 
frame frequency by month was not statistically significant, χ2 (10, N = 
600 = 14.91, ns. RQ2 asked about sentiment in the posts. Analysis dis-
covered that the least frequently observed sentiment was positive posts 
(n = 112; Figure 1). There were more posts with neutral sentiment (n = 
258) than negative (n = 230) or positive sentiment (n = 112).
When comparing the relationship between generic frames and 
sentiment, as asked in RQ3a, morality and sentiment were significantly 
correlated with each other, V = .27, p < .001, indicating that Twitter users 
viewed posts framing the incident in terms of morality more negatively 
FIGURE 1 Distribution of sentiment by month. The sentiment by month is significantly 
different, χ2 (10, N = 600) = 144.18, p < .001.
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than positively. The same finding was also observed between attribution 
and sentiment, V = .26, p < .001 (Table 4).
RQ3b looked at the relationship between issue-specific frames and 
sentiment. Most issue-specific frames were correlated with negative 
sentiment (Table 5). Corporate breakdown was highly associated with 
negative sentiment, V = .45, p < .001. Customer concerns, side effects, 
fires on the phone, safety, and explosion evidence were significantly 
associated with negative sentiment. However, the significant associa-
tion between product quality and sentiment demonstrated that sev-
eral supporters of Samsung posted the quality of Galaxy Note 7 more 
positively than neutrally, V = .21, p < .001. Regarding design, there 
was more positive sentiment than negative, V = .19, p < .001. RQ3c 
questioned how cross-national frames were related to sentiment. As 
shown in Table 6, there was no significant relationship between them. 
No discrepancies were found between negative and positive sentiment 
by cross-national frames.
TABLE 4 Cramer’s V Correlations Between Generic Frames and Sentiment
Sentiment, no. (%)
Frame Negative Neutral Positive Total V
Conflict 26 (42.6) 23 (37.7) 12 (19.7) 61 0.04
Economic 
consequence
26 (43.3) 22 (36.7) 12 (20.0) 60 0.04
Human 
impact
6 (46.2) 3 (23.1) 4 (30.8) 13 0.06
Morality 70 (66.0) 28 (26.4) 8 (7.5) 106 0.27***
Attribution 80 (61.1) 43 (32.8) 8 (7.1) 131 0.26***
Total 208 119 44 371
Note. N = 371. The total numbers of each row and column do not match 600 because the frequen-
cies display presence only. The frequencies of presence were summed up in total. The frequencies 
of absence were not included in the table, for readability.
*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .001.
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Discussion
This analysis of Samsung crisis posts demonstrates that social media 
are a sphere of disseminating news, opinions, and sentiment. Posts on 
social media may affect both the corporation and the public in terms 
of reputation management, PR strategies, and behavioral intentions. 
This study investigated framing types and expressed sentiment in 
Twitter posts about the Samsung crisis and associated sentiment with 
particular framing types. These research questions are of importance 
for both academics and practitioners for several reasons. Nowadays, 
global organizations are crisis prone due to the snowballing and unlim-
ited nature of global media platforms such as Twitter. Also, as digital 
media have evolved, so has the audience. As opposed to customers 
at brick-and-mortar stores—the vast majority of which are valued 
customers—users of social media tend to respond quickly and often 
without mercy when a corporation faces a crisis, thereby exacerbating 
the issue via sharing behaviors. This study paid special attention to 
Twitter as one of the most influential social media platforms, especially 
when conveying breaking stories to the masses (Murthy, 2011).
The findings of this study demonstrate where sentiment lies dur-
ing or after a crisis. The first set of research questions (RQ1) concerned 
how an international corporate crisis was framed on social media. In 
RQ1a on generic frames, findings demonstrated that attribution and 
morality frames were more frequently posted than conflict, economic 
consequence, and human impact frames. For instance, a South Korean 
TABLE 6 Cramer’s V Correlations Between Cross-National Frames and Sentiment
Sentiment
Frame Negative Neutral Positive Total V (N)
Not identified 195 (39.6) 210 (42.7) 87 (17.7) 492
Professional 33 (31.7) 46 (44.2) 25 (24.0) 104
National 2 (50.0) 2 (50.0) 0 (0.0) 4
Total 230 258 112 600 0.06 (600)a
Note. Values in parentheses indicate percentages for each cross-national frame.
a The total number matches 600 because the frame items include all responses (professional, 
national, and not identified).
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user mentioned Samsung’s responsibility for the explosion on Twitter, 
writing, “OMG, should Samsung pay for the damage to the vehicle due 
to the phone explosion?” However, there were relatively few ethical 
actions or responsibility posts from Samsung. The most frequently 
used frame (attribution) this study found is congruent with previous 
research on news framing in traditional media (Semetko & Valkenburg, 
2000), indicating a consistency of framing regardless of the news dis-
semination platform.
As the findings of RQ1b illustrate, posts expressing negative senti-
ment (e.g., corporate breakdown, product quality, fire, and recall) were 
more frequently tweeted than posts expressing positive sentiment (e.g., 
solution, prevention, and safety). The pattern of issue coverage between 
legacy news media (Hong, 2013) and Twitter was similar in issue-specific 
framing. Findings suggest that Twitter users perform secondary crisis 
communication (SCC), which is defined as conveying news and others’ 
posts about the crisis (Zheng, Liu, & Davison, 2018). Social media users’ 
cognitive reputation in Samsung resulted in SCC, as they felt morally vi-
olated through the explosion incident. During and after the crisis, many 
posts highlighted the corporate breakdown of Samsung. For instance, a 
U.S. user’s retweet reads, “There’s a worldwide recall on the new Sam-
sung Note 7’s. It’s been reported they’re catching fire. Return it ASAP.”
The analysis for RQ1c found that there were more professional 
frames than national frames (see the appendix for sample tweets of 
cross-national frames). This result shows a slightly different pattern 
than the past research on crisis news coverage, which was national 
frame oriented (Mao, 2014; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996). We found 
more cosmopolitanism (no significant difference among the nations) 
than in the national frame. It should be noted that traditionally and 
conventionally framing theory itself has been utilized to identify and 
analyze “how journalists depict a crisis.” Yet this study applies framing 
theory differently than the previous approach, as we look at how global 
online users respond to a crisis rather than investigate press coverage. 
To be specific, in previous research (Mao, 2014), the Chinese press 
constructed two crises (the Asian financial crisis and the European 
debt crisis) with many levels of the national frame. The difference in 
findings between the current and previous studies might be due to the 
different natures of newspapers and Twitter.
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While we found the value of framing as theoretical and method-
ological tool for examining online audiences’ collective selection of 
information and sharing behaviors, we also found that cosmopolitan-
ism on the global media might prevail over the national frame. Twitter 
is a global medium, unlike traditional media platforms, such as local 
newspapers or national broadcasting, so the national frame might have 
disappeared or been watered down in comparison to a traditional form 
of media coverage. In an online sphere, global audiences and issue-based 
communities are formed and activated. Therefore the result might have 
been different than previous findings due to the different nature and 
scope of digital media platforms compared to traditional ones.
The second aim of the current study was to explore the distribution 
of sentiment in Twitter posts on the Samsung crisis (RQ2). Given the 
finding of more negative sentiment than positive sentiment, Twitter 
users may hold the power to collaborate in crisis frame building (van 
der Meer & Verhoeven, 2013). Twitter users’ power is an interactive 
process in which some posts on a topic can capture other users’ atten-
tion. Once the posts capture attention, they are retweeted. For example, 
a U.S. user retweeted the hyperlinked news with negative sentiment: 
“Samsung Galaxy Note 7 Disappoints; iPhone 7 Wins Before Launch? 
http://dlvr.it/M7mm9x #newiphone.”
A significant relationship was found between social media post 
frames and audience sentiment (RQ3). When correlations between 
generic frames and sentiment were tested in Cramer’s V analyses, 
attribution and morality were correlated with negative sentiment. 
Therefore this study suggests that prompt and constant responses to a 
crisis posted on the corporation’s social media pages can be used for 
shares and retweets. In this way, morality and attribution frames may 
be framed positively.
This interpretation of generic frames and sentiment applies to the 
comparison between issue-specific frames and sentiment. Corporate 
breakdown, customer concerns, and side effects were the top three 
issues highly associated with negative sentiment. This comparison sug-
gests that companies should manage social media posts to respond to 
a crisis strategically. Active posts, such as apologies, ideas to overcome 
corporate breakdowns, management of side effects, and the provision 
of solutions, can be some response options.
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Overall, most of the negative posts are centered around the “issue-
specific frame” with regard to product failure, not the national frame 
of the issue. Given these results, crisis communicators should note that 
the rebuild strategy is a recommendable action to turn around negative 
sentiment with crisis relief (Coombs, 2007). Also, this study’s results 
shed light on the importance and role of Twitter in cross-national crisis 
situations, as negative sentiment mushroomed with information sharing 
among global user communities. Samsung and influencers supporting 
the corporation would have used Twitter to rebuild Samsung’s reputa-
tion proactively. However, not enough suitable and effective responses 
and/or thoughtful communication messages from Samsung were found 
in response to product failure and corporate breakdown. Thus Sam-
sung seemed to fail to win immediate attention from customers in 
terms of handling the issue. This might be the case for other global IT 
corporations. IT corporations might not have feasible communication 
solutions or communication strategies against any potential and/or 
impending crises.
Audiences used Twitter for the news and information dissemination 
of the explosion in the form of retweets and comments. The current 
study found that users externalized breaking news on the explosion by 
hyperlinking. Hyperlinking invoked public discussion on the incident. 
Users participated in retweeting and commenting behaviors with per-
sonal sentiment. Past research demonstrated that social media users 
interpret news frames and create their own discussion forums on Twitter 
(Valenzuela, Piña, & Ramírez, 2017; Wasike, 2013). Therefore Twitter 
users create a new sphere of discussion by sharing frames (generic, 
issue specific) with other users actively.
Theoretical and Practical Implications
This study analyzed social media posts about a corporate crisis re-
garding generic, issue-specific, cross-national frames and regarding 
sentiment. This approach opens the possibility of combining framing 
and other crisis communication theories. The framing perspective 
can be incorporated into situational crisis communication theory in 
the social media context. The issues posted on social media can be 
elaborated on generic and issue-specific frames. Different crisis types 
(victim, accidental, and intentional) can be observed in those issues 
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on social media. Eventually, some posts can predict audiences’ positive 
or negative attitudes toward the corporation (Kim & Cameron, 2011).
The dominant negative posts on social media suggest that the plat-
form can be an influential channel for the global audience. In response 
to the crisis, findings reveal that social media users are highly concerned 
about corporate morality and attribution. Therefore corporations can 
pay attention to ethical and responsibility aspects in their social media 
posts. Given the positive relationship between issue-specific frames and 
negative sentiment, corporations may continually monitor social media 
posts and post emotional stories in an effort to elicit positive audience 
perceptions (Spence, Sellnow-Richmond, Sellnow, & Lachlan, 2016).
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
This study contains several methodological limitations. The sample (N = 
600) out of more than 100,000 Twitter posts does not fully reflect the 
Samsung Note 7 explosion. Although framing research uses a relatively 
small sample for manual coding, sample representativeness is a study 
limitation. Future research on big data can represent a valid state of 
the explosion incident. Intermedia agenda setting research can warrant 
the flow of social media posts on this topic. An expanded analysis of 
social media and traditional news media can show the power of media 
channels covering the issue and public perceptions. Therefore survey-
ing the public about attitudes toward a corporation can provide further 
answers. The survey questions for the public could be drawn from a 
content analysis of social media posts. Then the public could indicate 
how often they view the messages and evaluate the experience. Future 
research can compare social media posts with public attitudes.
In conclusion, the results of the present study imply that Twitter was 
used more for negative posts than for positive ones on the Samsung 
Galaxy Note 7 explosion case. Users paid attention to corporate morality, 
attribution, corporate breakdown, product quality, and the recall. Even 
though the national frame was not a significant frame, negative senti-
ment was prominent. The findings suggest that analyses of Twitter can 
provide a content structure of the Samsung Galaxy Note 7 explosion.
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Appendix: Sample Tweets of Cross-National Frames
Professional frame: RT @verge: Breaking: Samsung will report-
edly issue worldwide recall of Galaxy Note 7 http://www.theverge 
.com/2016/9/1/12759912/samsung-galaxy-note-7-recall?utm_campaign 
=theverge&utm_content=chorus&utm_medium=social&utm_source 
=twitter
National frame: RT @themoneygame: Korea’s won tumbles as BOK 
warns of possible Samsung Galaxy Note 7 fallout https://t.co/aEv7p 
C6amc
Not identified: RT @techtimestv: Here are some pics of Samsung 
Galaxy Note 7 @techtimestv
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1. Twitter started a 280-character tweet limit on November 7, 2017.
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ABSTRACT
The peer review process can be challenging. In this essay, the journal’s editor and editorial as-
sistant present a summary of reviewers’ comments to authors from the past year. In presenting 
themes across 79 reviews, this essay arms authors with knowledge about reviewers’ expectations 
for manuscripts submitted to the journal. A secondary aim of this essay is to encourage reviewers 
to continue providing supportive and helpful feedback. As the journal heads into its third year 
of publishing, we are well on our way to creating the fi rst home for high-quality risk and crisis 
communication research from around the globe.
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A common joke among academics is that Reviewer 2 embodies every-
thing wrong with the peer review process, including providing unhelp-
ful, unclear, obnoxious, and destructive feedback (Brown, 2015). At the 
time of writing this essay, the “Reviewer 2 Must Be Stopped!” Facebook 
group had nearly 19,000 members, and similar communities existed 
on Twitter. In an article in the Chronicle of Higher Education, Duncan 
(2018) categorized reviewers into three categories: Type 1 reviewers read 
manuscripts carefully and off er feedback that is helpful and specifi c; 
Type 2 reviewers provide general feedback that is diffi  cult to address, 
in part because these reviewers do not carefully read manuscripts; 
Type 3 reviewers exert their power rather than providing constructive 
feedback. We are happy to report that the vast majority of reviewers for 
the Journal of International Crisis and Risk Communication Research 
are Type 1 reviewers.
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In this essay, we reflect on the comments reviewers have provided to 
authors over the past year. In doing so, we aim to arm authors with the 
knowledge required to submit strong manuscripts. A secondary aim is 
to encourage reviewers to continue providing supportive and helpful 
feedback. Our goal is to detect patterns in reviewers’ comments as well 
as important outliers. To accomplish this goal, we used the qualitative 
analysis program NVivo to jointly code the anonymous reviews.1 In this 
essay, we present our key findings from multiple rounds of coding. All 
reviewers’ comments from the past year were downloaded from the 
online submission system, any identifying information was removed, 
and comments were uploaded into the NVivo qualitative analysis 
software. We split the comments into two sections and engaged in first-
round coding, identifying whether comments referred to the following 
sections: literature review, methods, results, discussion, and general 
writing issues. We then engaged in axial coding, further subcategoriz-
ing the codes in each section to better describe the properties of each 
initial section (Saldaña, 2015). We organize this essay by summarizing 
reviewers’ comments on the common sections of manuscripts and 
crosscutting feedback.
Summary of Reviewer Comments
Literature Review
Reviewers frequently note that authors have insufficient and/or un-
derdeveloped literature to ground their research. To improve literature 
reviews, recommendations include writing a comprehensive review, 
not just a review of sampled studies; including key studies, even if they 
are older “classics”; incorporating the most recent research; and clearly 
connecting each section of the literature review. Additionally, literature 
reviews should accurately summarize prior research and justify why 
some concepts and theories are included and others are not. For empiri-
cal research, reviewers note that literature reviews must justify the need 
for proposed research questions and hypotheses. For all manuscripts, 
reviewers ask for streamlined literature reviews to allow space for the 
other important parts of manuscripts. In short, reviewers are deep 
experts in crisis and risk communication and expect manuscripts to 
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reflect topic-matter expertise. When literature reviews were thorough, 
well argued, and logically organized, reviewers complimented authors 
for these noted strengths.
In terms of theories covered in literature reviews, some reviewers 
critique authors for selecting outdated or mismatched theories. Re-
viewers often comment on theory, including asking for the addition 
of well-developed theoretical frameworks when manuscripts do not 
include theory. When proposing new models or theories, reviewers 
request adequate justification for why new models or theories are 
needed.
Methods
The journal is open to any method, and thus reviewer comments were 
fairly diverse, because they were closely connected to the specific meth-
ods used. These methods include case studies, interviews, big data 
analysis, content analysis, systematic literature reviews, surveys, and 
experiments. Despite the variety of methods, generally, comments on 
methods can be categorized into three major concerns: sampling and 
study design, operationalization of variables, and analysis. Across all 
of these areas, reviewers show a clear preference for detailed methods 
sections.
Sampling and study design. Across methods, reviewers ask au-
thors to justify their samples. For example, in case studies, authors 
should explain why they selected certain cases and not others. Re-
viewers sometimes criticize authors for selecting cases that are out of 
date. MechanicalTurk (Mturk) is a popular data collection site, but 
information about recruiting via Mturk, and indeed recruiting for all 
samples, is needed. For example, reviewers asked, What was the call for 
participants? What incentives were participants offered? How was data 
cleaning undertaken? and What was the completion rate? Furthermore, 
reviewers request that authors explicitly state the limitations of their 
sampling strategies. In terms of study design, reviewers request clear, 
step-by-step explanations for all research designs. Reviewers further ask 
for appendices that include study manipulations in the case of experi-
ments, interview protocols in the case of qualitative research, search 
terms and databases employed in the case of systematic reviews, and 
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information about how social media posts were collected and in what 
time frame in the case of social media analysis.
Operationalization. Reviewers sometimes express concern with 
the operationalization of variables, especially when variables central to 
analysis are measured with only one item or when multidimensional 
concepts are measured with single items unlikely to capture the concept’s 
different dimensions. Alternatively, some reviewers express concern 
about low scale reliability. There was also concern that operationaliza-
tions of certain concepts did not match their conceptualizations and, 
in fact, were not measuring what they were intended to measure (i.e., 
they lacked validity). In content analyses in particular, reviewers call 
for clear explanation of how codes were applied, including providing 
exemplars for each code to aid understanding. Reviewers further call 
for explanation of how codebooks were developed. For experimental 
and survey research, reviewers ask authors to clearly report at least one 
exemplar question used to measure each central variable. Reviewers 
also need specific information about what covariates were measured. 
A final area of concern for some reviewers is when concepts central to 
certain theories were not captured in measurements or analysis.
Analysis. Reviewer comments regarding analytic methods vary 
widely, depending on the method used. Generally, reviewers ask au-
thors to explain why the chosen analytic method was appropriate given 
the available data and hypotheses/research questions. They also ask 
for clear explanations for methods employed. A common request for 
quantitative research is for authors to push their analyses further by 
using more sophisticated analytic techniques. Some reviewers remind 
authors of the importance of only reporting analyses that correspond 
to written hypotheses or research questions.
Results
In general, there were fewer concerns specific to research results com-
pared to other sections of submitted manuscripts. For quantitative stud-
ies, reviewers sometimes note a lack of precision and detail in reporting 
results. For example, reviewers ask authors to clarify whether they were 
reporting standardized or unstandardized coefficients. For qualitative 
research, reviewers often call for more rich details and additional ex-
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amples to demonstrate themes. Overall, reviewers find the inclusion of 
subheadings in results sections helpful. Subheadings may correspond 
with research questions or hypotheses to signal to the reader alignment 
between methods and results. Tables and figures are also useful and 
concise ways to represent results. Finally, for all research, reviewers 
recommend using precise language to convey findings accurately.
Discussion and Conclusions
For all methods, reviewers call on authors to move beyond a review of 
their findings in the discussion section. Instead, authors should engage 
past literature and provide practical and theoretical implications drawn 
from their findings. Reviewers recommend tying conclusions back to 
the extant research—including relevant research that may not have 
been included in the literature review. When authors are interpreting 
findings, reviewers ask authors to articulate the new contributions that 
their research makes. Practical contributions should be specific and 
actionable. Contributions to theory also should be specific. Review-
ers note that misalignment between findings and implications drawn 
is a common pitfall of discussion sections. Reviewers also frequently 
recommend using tentative language, rather than definitive language, 
in attempts to generalize findings to theory and practice.
Crosscutting Issues
Reviewers provided some comments on issues that pertain to multiple 
parts of manuscripts, as summarized in the following paragraphs.
“So what” issues. One of the most challenging aspects of research 
can be justifying the “so what” of a project. Unsurprisingly, reviewers 
often comment on the “so what” issue. First, the introduction and lit-
erature review must clearly and persuasively justify the “so what.” Part 
of this justification includes a deep understanding of the literature. In 
terms of how to specifically justify the “so what” of a project, reviewers 
recommend considering how the research contributes to society, theory 
building, methodological advancement, and/or risk and crisis com-
munication practice. Reviewers urge authors to make explicit reference 
to how their research extends, clarifies, or corrects past research in the 
discussion and conclusion section of manuscripts. In short, to address 
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the “so what” issue, authors can answer questions such as, Why is this 
study important? How can it improve practice? How can it develop 
theory? and What gaps does it fill?
General writing issues. Reviewers frequently express concerns 
about writing. These concerns can be categorized into four general 
areas: grammar mistakes or spelling typos, lack of attention to Ameri-
can Psychological Association (APA) style, lack of flow, and verbos-
ity. Grammar and/or spelling errors distract reviewers and, in some 
cases, impede understanding of manuscripts. Reviewers often suggest 
that authors conduct thorough proofreading of their work and pay 
careful attention to APA style. While recognizing the international 
scope of the journal and the importance of diverse voices in crisis and 
risk communication scholarship, many reviewers recommend the use 
of a copy editor, especially for authors who do not appear to be na-
tive English speakers. Furthermore, reviewers call for consistency in 
terms throughout manuscripts and ask authors to avoid passive voice, 
ensure subject–verb agreement, and employ appropriate word choice. 
The editorial team is committed to continuing to work with authors 
who are not native English speakers; yet, it is important to realize that 
reviewers have persistent concerns with writing for many manuscripts 
submitted to the journal.
Other writing issues are stylistic in nature. Reviewers note that 
manuscripts are often too long, sometimes as a result of unfocused 
literature reviews. Repetition in the author’s own writing also un-
necessarily increases length, and reviewers ask authors to make their 
manuscripts more succinct. Tips for improving the flow and length of 
a manuscript include avoiding redundancy in the introduction and 
literature review, adding subheaders, avoiding long paragraphs, and 
organizing the manuscript according to APA guidelines. Thinking 
of an article like an hourglass is a useful visualization: Start off broad 
in the introduction and narrow in as the article presents hypotheses/
research questions, methods, and findings. Broaden out again in the 
discussion and conclusion sections. In terms of flow, reviewers note 
two common issues with introductions: an insufficient introduction 
that jumps too quickly to the literature review or an introduction that 
does not introduce the topic at hand or explain why it is important to 
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study. Reviewers recommend strong thesis or purpose statements at 
the end of introductions to give readers a framework for the impor-
tance of the study. The target article length for the journal is 25 total 
pages, including references (the abstract and cover page do not count 
toward that limit).
Manuscript strengths. The majority of reviewers are constructive 
and sometimes take time to note manuscripts’ strengths. Generally, 
reviewers praise authors for focusing on interesting topics, such as 
crisis events of great significance to many, topics that illustrate unique 
deficiencies in crisis literature, and topics that provide fresh perspectives 
on risk or crisis communication theory. Studies with novel data and/or 
approaches also receive praise. As discussed, reviewers enjoy reading 
manuscripts with strong introductions that persuasively articulate the 
“so what,” employ clear and compelling writing, and have well-organized 
literature reviews. Finally, manuscripts with sophisticated analyses that 
lead to significant theoretical and/or applied advancements are highly 
commended.
Conclusion
When we accepted the offer to edit this journal more than a year ago, 
we were entering unknown territory: Would we receive sufficient qual-
ity research? Would reviewers provide consistently helpful feedback? 
Would the journal fulfill its mission of providing the first home for 
cutting-edge, open-access crisis and risk communication scholarship? 
As is evident in the articles published over the past 2 years, we are well 
on our way to fulfilling our mission, a mission that includes publishing 
scholarship from emerging and well-established scholars from around 
the globe. This essay further demonstrates that reviewers are indeed 
providing quality feedback. By lifting the veil of secrecy behind the peer 
review process, our intent in this essay is to help authors submit even 
higher quality scholarship to the journal. Together we can continue 
to build the premier peer-reviewed journal for crisis and risk com-
munication scholarship.
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Note
1. The University of Maryland Institutional Review Board (IRB) was con-
sulted to determine whether this essay constituted human subjects research, 
thus necessitating informed consent. The IRB determined that this essay is 
“not research.”
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